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Table of Contents

1. Ambassador's Note: Fostering Multilateralism for a Shared Future	
<i>Ambassador Radhia Naima Mtengeki Msuya</i>	<i>1</i>
2. Twenty Years of EAC: Leveraging Tanzania's Manufactured Exports through EAC Trade Arrangements	
<i>Janeth Malleo.....</i>	<i>2</i>
3. Imperialism and the Relevance of Constructivist Approach to the Analysis of International Relations	
<i>Chediel Nyirenda</i>	<i>17</i>
4. Global Governance, Energy Policies and Security of Supply of Liquefied Petroleum Gas in Tanzania	
<i>Juma Mabasa Kanurwa & Jensen G Mahavile.....</i>	<i>33</i>
5. The Relevance of 'Nyumba Kumi' Grassroots Security Structure in Addressing the Rise of Extremist Violence in Tanzania	
<i>David Jeremia Luheja</i>	<i>46</i>
6. Police - Civilians Relationship and Crime Rate Reduction in Tanga Urban	
<i>Godwin Gonde Amani.....</i>	<i>62</i>
7. EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination: Why has the Implementation Fallen Short of Expectations?	
<i>Jacob Lisakafu</i>	<i>73</i>

Ambassador's Note: Fostering Multilateralism for a Shared Future

By

Ambassador Radhia Naima Mtengeki Msuya

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The world today is increasingly interconnected and interdependent to the extent that national challenges often transcend borders calling for international action. Issues such as economic inequality, food insecurity, and social injustice are no longer confined to individual nations. They require collaborative efforts, shared solutions, and a united vision. This is where multilateralism serves as an essential cornerstone for safeguarding human dignity, promoting peace, and building resilient societies.

At its heart, multilateralism embodies the principles of partnership and cooperation. By uniting nations under shared commitments, we strengthen our collective ability to avert conflicts, combat human trafficking, protect the most vulnerable, and address the complex global challenges of our time. Education, social security, and economic development become more sustainable and equitable when they are pursued in harmony across borders. Likewise, environmental protection and justice demand concerted effort to ensure that future generations inherit a liveable planet.

Our commitment to multilateralism is not just a diplomatic endeavour—it is a moral imperative. By working together, we amplify our ability to provide opportunities for all, safeguard food security, and promote the well-being of individuals and communities alike. No nation can achieve these goals in isolation, but together, through trust and collaboration, we can create a future that upholds the ideals of human rights, justice, and sustainable development.

Both governments and citizens of the world must support United Nations' initiatives like the Sustainable Development Goals. Besides, we are the United Nations. Let this serve as a call to action for governments, international organizations, civil society, and individuals to champion multilateralism. Let us collectively strengthen our efforts to address shared challenges with compassion, vision, and unity. Together, we can create a world where no one is left behind!

Twenty Years of EAC: Leveraging Tanzania's Manufactured Exports through EAC Trade Arrangements

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Abstract

The empirical literature on Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) posits that regionalism improves intra-bloc trade, economic growth, and people's welfare, particularly through enhancing exports of manufactured goods. Using panel data from various sources, this study examines the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports to a sample of 15 trading partners (including EAC member states) by estimating the gravity model, using a multiplicative form of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. The results show that the RTAs for the EAC lead to a decrease of 271.5% of Tanzania's manufactured exports, on average, whereas controlling for trade costs suggests that the EAC-RTAs decrease the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports by 110%. Thus, for Tanzania to benefit from EAC-RTAs, there is need to strengthen its manufacturing sector. The key policy issue is to improve the export competitiveness of Tanzania's manufactured goods, through cross-cutting sectoral interventions to support value-addition to agricultural products by initiating large and small-scale industrialization.

Keywords:

East African Community, Gravity model, Industrialization, Manufactured Exports, Regional Trade Arrangement.

1. Introduction

For a long time, manufacturing has been prominent in global economic development. During Europe's industrialization in the nineteenth century, manufacturing became the so-called engine of economic growth (Amakom, 2012). In recent decades, the Asian developing countries have carried out industrialization and a successful export drive, along with wide-reaching human capital development, especially in education, science, and technology. Naudé and Szirmai (2012) argue that in the twenty-first century, development in manufacturing is a prerequisite for poor countries attempting to catch up with the advanced economies, aiming to increase the standards of living for their populations.

The common factor for the stagnation of many African economies in the post-independence period has been a decline in their exports, contrary to the Asian Tigers which, as noted above, have seen a rapid and steady growth of their exports, particularly their manufactured exports (Söderbom & Teal, 2002). Trade statistics from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) indicate that manufactured exports accounted for 70% of the

total worldwide merchandise exports in 2017. Such benefits of the manufacturing sector for a country are predicated on well-structured industrial and trade policies.

Generally, trade liberalization has been one of the key policies adopted by countries that have succeeded to build a strong manufacturing sector. Supporters of trade liberalization posit that it provides opportunities for increased scale efficiency and competitiveness, which prompt domestic firms to adopt efficient technologies and reduce waste (Umoru, and Eberiemu, 2013). One of the tools for trade liberalization has been regional integration, particularly through Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs), which lead to lower trade barriers and expanded market access, thereby maximizing the gains from trade for member states.

2. Tanzania and Regional Trade Agreements in the EAC

The East African Community (EAC) considered during the writing of this paper, is the RTA consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. The Regional Trade Arrangements for the EAC (EAC-RTAs) at this time include a customs union, common market, and other interim agreements facilitating trade within the region. The EAC Customs Union undertook to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers among partner states and forged a Common External Tariff (CET) scheme. The EAC-CET recognized the asymmetry of its partner states and therefore to ensure equity in its effect, different arrangements were undertaken in the CET, including a three-band tariff structure (McIntyre, 2005). The CET was also designed to promote the manufacturing sector in the region and home industries and to boost the possibilities of export development and promote economic growth as a result. Manufactured goods play a significant role in the commodity composition in trade flow within the EAC. Kenya has been leading in terms of manufacturing development relative to other EAC member states. The RTA provides a potential market for manufactured exports, particularly from Kenya.

In recognizing that, the RTA agreed to allow goods from other EAC partner states to enter Kenya duty-free, while goods from Kenya are to be charged import duty. The aim was to support/protect manufacturing in other EAC partner states which were considered to be far behind Kenya's manufacturing capacity. The EAC countries have been benefitting from the RTAs, including increasing intra-regional trade and investment among member countries, which would consequently increase their exports and develop further their economies (World Bank, 2019; Nugent and Soi, 2020; TMEA, 2020). The EAC focuses on improving the competitiveness of the industrial sector to enhance the expansion of trade in industrial goods by increasing the share of manufactured exports in total exports to at least 60% within the Community, as partner members export to and import from one another.

The manufacturing sector in Tanzania is still small in terms of its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and export trade, as is the case for many of the developing countries. The sector's contribution to GDP has ranged between 6% and 11% (World Bank Report, 2020). To unearth the dynamism of the manufacturing sector, Tanzania has identified key areas for improvement, which include Information and Communication Technology (ICT), infrastructure (energy and transport); and strategic

sectors, such as cotton textiles, high-value crops, grains (for food self-sufficiency and export), skills development, finance and heavy industry (Wangwe et al, 2014).

Tanzania's exports and imports grew at a faster rate than that of the GDP immediately after the formation of the EAC in 2000, and the share of the total trade in the GDP increased from 39% to 86% from 2001 to 2011 (ADB, 2015). To date, however, little is known about the impact of EAC-RTAs on the performance of manufactured exports in Tanzania. This study has attempted to contribute knowledge in this regard, focusing on the reformed EAC since 2001 (however, South Sudan was excluded due to insufficiency of data, since the country acceded to the EAC treaty recently). The study investigated the extent to which the EAC-RTA has affected the pace of development of Tanzania's manufacturing sector. The study has estimated econometrically the augmented gravity model to shed more light on the role of EAC-RTAs on Tanzania's manufactured exports.

Foreshadowing the main findings, EAC-RTA led to a decrease of 271.5% of Tanzania's manufactured exports, on average, whereas controlling for trade costs suggests that the EAC - RTAs decrease the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports by 110%. The findings not only add to the empirical literature on the role of regional integration on partner country trade performance; but also, to policy considerations concerning the use of other Regional Trade Arrangements of which Tanzania is a member, including the upcoming African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The remaining parts of this paper are arranged as follows; literature review in section two, Methodology in section three, Findings and discussion in section four and section five concludes the paper by presenting policy recommendations.

Studies on trade policy reforms show steady improvements in the manufacturing sector in Tanzania since 1990 (Wangwe et al., 2014, Kahyarara, 2013). Tanzania was a net exporter to other EAC countries, with a trade surplus of USD 193.3 million in 2018 compared with a surplus of USD 130.3 million in the preceding year (EAC, 2018). Kenya continued to be Tanzania's dominant partner, accounting for 73.8% of Tanzania's intra-EAC trade. In the EAC, Tanzania's major trading partners are Kenya, followed by Rwanda and Uganda. In 2018, the leading destination of Tanzania's intra-EAC exports was Kenya though its share declined to 67.7% from 72.9% in 2016 (BOT Annual report, 2019/2020). Kenya remained the major source of Tanzania's intra-EAC imports, accounting for 84.9% in 2018 compared with 89.1% in the preceding year. Tanzania's major exports to the EAC region were beans, maize grain, sisal rope, tea, and mosquito nets. Major imports include medicines, soap, chewing gum, salt, margarine, gas oil, and crown corks.

3. Theorizing Trade Areas

The importance of the manufacturing sector was examined by Marconin and Araujo (2016), who used the Kaldorian model to determine the role of manufacturing exports in the economic growth of middle-income countries. The study used a panel data set and the Generalized Method of Moments was to estimate the Kaldorian model in first-differences and found a positive relationship between manufactured exports and economic growth. The coefficient was found to be greater for middle-income countries, which indicated that the manufacturing export sector's role of supplementing and even stimulating growth is greater in countries at the intermediate stage of development. As

well, the model recognizes increasing returns in the manufacturing sector due to technological development.

Hertel, Lee, Rose and Sohngen (2006) analysed the impact of a Free Trade Area (FTA) using the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and found that countries joining FTAs would experience an increase of imports from member countries; which would mean an increase in the volume of trade across the bloc, apart from trade with the rest of the world. Schiff and Winters (2003) point out two necessary conditions for an RTA to serve as a commitment mechanism. One is that the benefit of continued membership is greater than the immediate gains of exit and the value of returning to alternative policies. The second condition is that the punishment threat is credible. Entering RTAs may increase intra-regional trade and investment and also link countries in a web of positive interactions and interdependency. Mukwaya, (2019) analysed the impact of Regional Trade Agreements on manufactured exports from 45 African countries using a gravity model with PPML estimator and tested for reverse causality between trade flows and RTAs. Using manufactured exports from 45 countries to the rest of the world in the period 1990-2015, (Mukwaya, *ibid.*) included the lagged RTAs variable over 4 years intervals to capture the gradual effects of RTA on trade performance. The findings of the study showed that African RTAs led to an increase of 72% in intra-regional manufacturing exports 12 years after the ratification of the agreements.

However, MacPhee and Sattayanuwat (2014) using a gravity model with 3 separate dummy variables for RTAs to capture trade creation and trade diversion effect for 12 developing countries' RTAs found differing results. The researchers targeted to establish whether RTAs are complements to or substitute of the multilateral free trade agreements. The study found out that most of the RTAs in developing countries failed on intra-bloc with trade creation, whereas extra-bloc export variables were statistically insignificant. For the African RTAs, the findings show that three of the five African RTAs in the sample (including the EAC) generated intra-bloc trade, despite severe political and economic setbacks. The study concludes that RTAs are a poor substitute for multilateral trade liberalization because in most cases member states in RTAs may not have lowered restrictions on imports from non-member states and may not be able to increase the competitiveness of their exports in the global market.

Thus, in theory, RTAs can be important for the growth of manufactured exports, as long as member states adhere to the agreed supportive trade policies (e.g., tariffs and non-tariff barriers). However, the outcomes may not uphold the theory, as evidenced by contradicting findings from the reviewed empirical studies. Due to the inconclusiveness of the findings concerning the importance of trade, particularly of manufactured exports, in enhancing economic growth, this study has used the gravity model, as borrowed from Mukwaya (2018) and MacPhee & Sattayanuwat (2014), to examine the impact of RTA (through the EAC-RTA variable) on Tanzania's manufactured exports, to add Tanzania's experience to the corpus of the knowledge on the issue.

4. Model and Method of Analysis

4.1. Model Description

This study employed panel data collected from 15 trade partners, including four EAC partners, for a period 2000-2018. The study design sought to show how competitive Tanzania's manufacturing exports are in the EAC market. Gravity Model (GM) was used to analyse the impact of EAC-RTA on manufactured exports from Tanzania, particularly in addressing the main question of this study. The GM describes how the value of trade between any two countries depends on the size of these countries and partly explains the reason for their relationship. The volume of trade between any two countries can be predicted as in Equation 1 by a gravity model taking the following form:

$$T_{ij} = (A \times Y_i \times Y_j) / D_{ij} \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

Where:

A = is a constant

T_{ij} the value of trade between country i and country j

Y_i country i's GDP

Y_j country j's GDP

D_{ij} the distance between the two countries

Gravity models have been used by scholars to estimate trade flows, patterns, intra-regional trade, implications of trade policies, trade barriers, and performance of international trade. The model was pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) to estimate trade flows. Since then, the model has been augmented by including various variables that affect trade flows between two countries. Ekanayake, Mukherjee, and Veeramacheneni (2010) used the GM to analyse trade creation and trade diversion effects of the regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Asia and their effects on intra-regional trade flows.

4.2. Estimation Procedure

To study the effect of EAC-RTA on the performance of Tanzania's manufactured exports, the structured gravity model was estimated using a multiplicative form of Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) used to measure the effect of RTAs (Yotov et al., 2012). The PPML estimation has the advantage that it can be estimated in a nonlinear form. In addition, it still works if zeros entries (the non-existence of trade between some countries) are included in the trade data (Morland, Schier and Weima, 2020). Furthermore, PPML gives consistent estimates, even with heteroskedasticity in the data.

The PPML regression was conducted by comparing different scenarios, first without the Multilateral Resistant Term (MRT), importer and exporter fixed effect; second by controlling the Multilateral Resistant term using the dummy variables, including common official language, common colonialist, contiguous border, and EAC regional trade resistance without importers, and exports time fixed effects. The third is PPML with both Multilateral Resistant Term, importers and exports time fixed effects. In the second and third regressions, paired fixed effects were used to control for endogeneity.

The GM estimated in this study is as follows:

$$X_{ij,t}^k = \exp[\pi_{i,t} + \chi_{j,t} + \alpha_{ij} + \beta_1 \ln GDP_{ijt} + \beta_2 \ln POPN_{ijt} + \beta_3 \ln Er_{ijt} + \beta_4 \ln DIST_{ij} + \beta_5 BDR_{ij} + \beta_6 LANG_{ij} + \beta_7 CLNY_{ij} + \beta_8 EAC_{ij}] \mu_{ij} \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

Where:

$j = 1, 2, \dots, 15$ [which constitute a list of included countries, namely, the EAC countries (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) and non EAC members (DRC Congo, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, Comoros, United Arabs Emirates, China, India, United Kingdom and United states)].

$i = 1$ (Tanzania)

t = time, in years

k = manufactured exports;

X_{ijt}^k = Tanzania's manufactured exports to countries j at year t ;

$\pi_{i,t}$ = the set of time-varying source-country dummy variables, which control for the outward multilateral resistances;

$\chi_{i,t}$ = set of time-varying destination-country dummy variables that account for the inward multilateral resistances, total expenditure, and any other observable and unobservable importer-specific characteristics that may influence trade;

α_{ij} = set of country-pair fixed effects;

GDP_{ijt} = Exporter and importer's GDP at year t ;

POP_{ijt} = Exporter and importer's Population in year t ;

Er_{ijt} = Real Exchange rate between Tanzania and country j in year t ;

$DIST_{ij}$ = Bilateral distance between country i and j ;

BDR_{ij} = an indicator variable that captures the presence of contiguous borders;

$LANG_{ij}$ = Dummy variable for Common Official language;

$CLNY_{ij}$ = Dummy variable for colonial ties;

EAC_{ij} = dummy variable that accounts for the presence of an EAC trade agreement between trading partners i and j ; and

μ_{ij} = is a log-normal random variable with mean 1 and variance σ_i^2

and β are coefficients to be estimated.

5. Sources of Data

The study has employed panel data from a sample of 15 countries, including four EAC partner states, that traded with Tanzania in the period 2000–2018. The study used disaggregated manufacturing exports data at HS code level 2 for Tanzania. The data were collected from different sources as presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Variable Description and Data source

Variable	Description	Data Source	Measurement
Tanzania's manufactured exports	The dependent variable is Tanzania's manufactured exports to its 15 trading partners, both EAC and non-EAC states.	World Trade (WITS)	Integrated Solution Export (USD thousand)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	GDP for Tanzania and partner states. GDP is used as a proxy of economic size.	World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)	Current USD
Distance	Distance is measured in kilometers and is calculated by measuring the distance from Dar-es-Salaam, the commercial capital city of Tanzania, and the capital cities of partner states.	Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII)	Kilometres
Population	Population of Tanzania and partners states is used as a measure	World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)	Total

Real exchange rate	of the market size of Tanzania's manufactured exports. First, the nominal exchange rate was calculated by dividing the partner's currency per dollar over Tanzania currency per dollar. Then nominal exchange rate time GDP deflator divide by GDP deflator to compute the real exchange rate	PENN World Tables (PWT)	Nominal *Country deflator/ GDP deflator	ER GDP TZA
Contiguous border	Contiguous Border captures whether countries share a common border or not.	CEPII	Dummy	
Common Official Language	Common Official Language captures whether the two countries speak the same language or not.	CEPII	Dummy	
Colonial Ties	Colonial Ties captures whether two countries were colonised with the same colonist or not.	CEPII	Dummy	
East African Community (EAC)	EAC variable captures whether the trading partner state is the member to the EAC-RTA	CEPII	Dummy	

Source: Author's compilation

6. Empirical Results and Discussion

6.1 General Estimation Results of the Model

Table 2 provides the panel coefficients of the gravity model after PPML regression estimation. Column 1 provides coefficient estimates of the PPML model. Column 2, represents the PPML estimation with the control of MRT. The two estimate techniques in columns 1 and 2 give the same coefficient estimates. Column 3 presents PPML which controls for the MRT, importer time, and exporter time fixed effects to correct for the endogeneity of the RTA. In the parentheses are respective robust standard errors that address the heteroskedasticity. The estimation coefficients of the pair fixed effects are smaller in column 3 than the estimation coefficients in columns 1 and 2 because the estimation technique in column 3 absorbs all-time invariant bilateral trade costs.

Table 2: PPML estimation results of the Gravity Model

Variable	PPML	PPML with MRT	PPML with MRT, Imp FE & Exp FE
lnGDP	.8697*** (.0827)	.8697*** (.1085)	.6542*** (.125)
lnPOP	-.2441 *** (.0782)	-.2441 *** (.0961)	-.1395 (.095)
lnRER	.1609*** (.0434)	.1609*** (.0493)	.0798* (.0479)
Indist	-2.0793 *** (.2388)	-2.0793*** (.1972)	-1.7636*** (.215)
contig	1.9392*** (.3054)	1.9392*** (.3536)	1.3800 *** (.345)
comlang_off	.2747 (.2285)	.2747* (.1623)	.0128 * (.199)
comcol	-1.3467 *** (.3254)	-1.3467*** (.2400)	-1.0035 *** (.245)
EACRTA	-1.3124***	-1.3124 ***	-.7445 **

	(.1771)	(.2483)	(.277)
Exp_year			.04322 (.028)
Imp_year			.0021 * (.001)
_cons	-7.6880 *** (1.8582)	-7.6880*** (1.5645)	-4.1193 ** (1.70)

Source: Author's Calculation. Robust standard errors are presented in the parenthesis and the p-values read as follows: *p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

A broader interpretation of the estimation results in Table 2 is as follows:

i. Gross Domestic Products (GDP):

The coefficient associated with GDP is positive and significant in all three estimation techniques used. The coefficient is the same in columns 1 and 2 but slightly decreased in magnitude in column 3 due to absorption of trade costs. The positive and strongly significant coefficient of GDP ($\beta_1 = .8697$) in columns 1 and 2 suggests that all other variables remain constant. Growth in the GDP by 1% will increase Tanzanian manufactured exports by 138.6%. Meanwhile, according to the estimation in column 3, the magnitude of the effects decreases, and the coefficient of GDP ($\beta_1 = .6542$) shows that when other variables are constant, the growth in GDP by 1% will lead to an increase in Tanzanian manufactured exports by 92.4%.

ii. Population:

The coefficient associated with the population variable is negative and significant in column 1 and column 2 of Table 2. The coefficient ($\beta_2 = -.2441$) suggests that growth in the population by 1% will decrease Tanzania's manufactured exports by 27.6%. However, the result of the estimation in column 3 of the PPML with multilateral resistance terms and the country's paired fixed effect shows the coefficient of the population to be statistically insignificant.

iii. Real Exchange Rates:

The coefficient associated with the real exchange rate variable is positive and significant at 1%. The value $\beta_3 = .1609$ shows that when other variables are constant a one-unit increase in the real exchange rate will increase Tanzania's manufactured exports by 17.5%. For the PPML estimation with multilateral resistance terms and countries paired fixed effect, the coefficient decreases in magnitude and it is significant at 10%. The coefficient ($\beta_3 = .0798$) shows that when other variables are constant, an increase in real exchange rate by 1 unit will increase Tanzanian manufactured exports by 8.3%.

iv. Distance:

The coefficient associated with 'distance' is negative and significant in all 3 estimation techniques indicating a negative relationship between distance and trade flows. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient ($\beta_4 = -2.0793$) suggests that with all other variables unchanged, for every one-kilometre increase in distance between Tanzania and its trading partner, Tanzania's manufactured exports decrease by 699%. However, for the estimation in column 3, the magnitude of the effects decreases. Thus, the coefficient ($\beta_4 = -1.7636$) shows that for every one-kilometre increase in distance between Tanzania and its trading partner, the flow of Tanzanian manufactured exports decreases by 483%.

v. Contiguous Border:

The coefficient on the 'contiguous border' variable is positive and significant in all three estimations, indicating that the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports increases for trading partners sharing the border with Tanzania. The coefficient ($\beta_5=1.9392$) suggests that with all other variables remaining unchanged, the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports is 595.3% more for countries that are sharing the border with Tanzania than for countries that are not sharing the border. In column 3 the magnitude decreases, whereby the coefficient ($\beta_5=1.3800$) shows that the flow of Tanzanian manufactured exports is 297.5 % more for a trading partner that shares a border with Tanzania compared to trading partners that are not sharing any border with Tanzania.

vi. Common Official Language:

The coefficient on 'common official language' is positive and significant in the second column of the estimation with control of MRT with a coefficient $\beta_6=.2747$, indicating that with all other variables remaining constant, the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports increases by 31.6% more for trading partners with common official language compared to trading partners with different official languages. For PPML estimation with MRT and countries paired fixed effects, the coefficient is significant (i.e., $\beta_6=.0128$) indicating that the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports increases by 1.3% for trading partners with a common official language compared to trading partners with different official languages.

vii. Common Colonialist:

The coefficient on 'common colonialist' is significant but with unexpected signs in all three estimations. The coefficient ($\beta_7=-1.3467$) indicates that, with all other variables unchanged, the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports decreases by 284% more for countries with the common colonialist. For the estimation in Column 3, the coefficient ($\beta_7=-1.0035$) suggests that the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports decreases by 172.8% more for the trading partners with the common colonialist.

The estimated coefficients of GDP, real exchange rates, distance, contiguous border, and common official language from this estimation have expected signs, with these results being similar to most of the previous results in studies that used the gravity model to estimate bilateral trade effects. The size of the economy (which was proxied with the GDP) shows that when the economy grows, productivity tends to increase, thereby increasing the capacity of the country to produce manufactured goods. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the gravity trade flow where mass (GDP) has positive impacts on the trade volume. It is also consistent with Bekele and Mersha (2019).

The geographical distance was found to have a negative effect on the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports, which is consistent with the expectation from the gravity model and the first estimation of the gravity model by Tinbergen (1962). Furthermore, the use of the same language shows to lead to more exports, which is consistent with Li, Lu, and Chen (2020). The Kiswahili language, which is the official and most spoken language in Tanzania is also widely used by its major trading partners, especially Kenya and DRC, which may account for the obtained results.

Population represents the market size. This study indicated that its effect on manufactured exports is negative, which was contrary to the expected result. The possible reason could be accounted to Tanzania's large population relative to other countries in the EAC region (with a population estimated at just above 60 million, followed by Kenya with about 53 million). A large population coupled with a small manufacturing sector implies high demand for domestic consumption and insufficient supply within the country. Hence, as the population increases, manufactured exports may tend to decrease to meet the internal supply. This finding is consistent with Li, Lu, and Chen's (2020) finding, who employed the gravity model to estimate China's importance in the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) trade patterns, which showed the population of China to have a negative impact on BRI trade.

The result concerning common colonialist was in contrast to expectation, as it shows a negative impact on Tanzania's manufactured exports. Tanzania was under German rule from 1880 to 1919 and was then occupied by the British from 1919 to 1961. Change in the colonizers could be one of the reasons; but also, the inclusion of developed countries that were former colonizers could be another reason accounting for these results.

6.2 Explaining the Results with respect to the EAC-RTA

The results in this case were contrary to expectations. The coefficient is negative and significant, which implies that the EAC-RTA tends to harm the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports to the EAC. For the estimation in Columns 1 and 2, the coefficient ($\beta_8 = -1.3124$) is statistically significant at 1%, which implies that with other variables remaining constant, the EAC-RTA has led to a decrease of about 271.5% of Tanzania's manufactured exports. In column 3, the coefficient ($\beta_8 = -.7445$) implies that with all other variables remaining unchanged, the EAC-RTA has led to a decrease of about 110% in Tanzania's manufactured exports in the period under investigation.

Although the finding of the negative EAC-RTA impact on Tanzanian manufactured exports is contrary to expectation, it is consistent with Yang and Gupta's (2005) findings, who also found RTAs to have a statistically insignificant impact on Africa's export performance, particularly for the manufactured exports. The result from this study does not mean that the EAC-RTA is not good for Tanzania's overall trade flow. Rather, it indicates that all the precautions taken to protect the manufacturing sector of small economies have been not successful. The EAC has experienced intra-bloc trade creation by increasing trade among its members by about 226% (MacPhee and Sattayanuwat, 2014). This means other sectors in Tanzania that participate in EAC trade also benefit from the created intra-bloc trade. Umulisa (2020) found that the Intra EAC trade flows increased by 122% over and above what was expected.

Tanzania has been benefiting from EAC-RTA exporting traditional agricultural products, especially cereals in the region to the EAC markets. Tanzania is a major grain exporter in the region and a seasonal exporter of fruits and vegetables, especially to Kenya (Cooksey, 2016). Nevertheless, Tanzania's manufactured goods are negatively impacted by EAC-RTA due to the differences in economic sizes and manufacturing sector sizes between trading partners. This was recognized even in the former EAC, which collapsed in 1977. During the negotiation phase for a reformed EAC, the differences in economic sizes between partner states was noted, where Kenya is the giant economy and

its manufacturing sector is far bigger in comparison with other partner states. Since the structure of manufacturing production is similar in the EAC region with food and beverages taking a bigger proportion between half and two-thirds, the giant economy is expected to benefit more than the rest of the partners in the region (Mold, 2015).

To address the difference in size, negotiations on the removal of tariffs and EAC-CET were done in consideration of the economic position of the partner states. However, the findings from this study imply that, regardless of the precaution taken by the EAC-RTA to protect the manufacturing sector in the region, the EAC was unable to contribute to the growth of the manufacturing sector of Tanzania. This finding is in contrast to Mukwaya (2019) whose findings showed that the formation of RTA would lead to an increase in manufactured exports by 72%.

China is among the leading trading partners of the EAC region, excluding Burundi (Mold, 2015). Tanzania's trade statistics of 2017 and 2018 show that Chinese imports constituted 19%-20% of the total country's imports, whereas imports from the EAC trading partners were below 5% (NBS, 2019). EAC Trade and Investment Report (EAC, 2018) also presents the dominance of Chinese imports. The report presents all the EAC being importers of Chinese products for about 20%, whereas cross member-states trade was on the average of below 5% (EAC 2018). The 20% level of imports means the regional market is dominated and flooded by Chinese manufactured goods. The flooding of Chinese competitive manufactured imports in the EAC region is another possible reason for the low level of growth of Tanzania's manufacturing exports in the region.

The Chinese manufactured products are relatively cheap in the market, whereas manufactured products from the EAC are expensive and uncompetitive in the region. Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) posit that the flooding of Chinese manufactured products in the EAC region at the expense of the local producers widely affect the economies of member states. Apart from weakening the local producers in the East African states, the flooding of Chinese products has adverse effects on economic growth and employment. Furthermore, there is a lack of alignment between the EAC industrialization strategy and the industrialization policies of individual member states (Mold, 2015). Despite a well-planned EAC industrialization strategy, it has not been implemented due to the lack of resources; which has led to poor implementation at the level of individual member states, including Tanzania.

Another possible reason for the negative impact of EAC-RTA is the low competitiveness of the Tanzanian manufacturing sector. Tanzania has failed to establish internationally competitive manufacturing industries in areas such as agro-processing, textiles, garments and electronics; and there are very few examples of Tanzanian firms that have been integrated into the global value chains (UNIDO, 2012). Manufactured products embody more knowledge and technological content; yet, technological development in Tanzania is, in general, still very low.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The objective of this study was to examine the contribution of EAC-RTA on the performance of Tanzania's manufactured exports. A gravity model was estimated with data from 15 trading partners, including EAC partner states. The panel data set for the

period 2000–2018 was used for the study. The study findings revealed that EAC-RTAs have negative effects on the flow of Tanzania's manufactured exports. Empirical estimation results indicate that EAC-RTA has negative impacts on the flow of Tanzanian manufactured exports. The study used three estimation techniques, namely, PPML, PPML with control of MRT and PPML with control of MRT and country's time fixed effects. In all the three estimation techniques, the impact of EAC-RTA was negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the EAC-RTA constrains rather than facilitates the trading of Tanzania's manufactured exports.

Furthermore, the study findings suggest that the likely reasons that account for the limited contribution of the EAC-RTA to the performance of Tanzania's manufactured exports include the differences in the size of manufacturing sectors and sizes of the economy, lack of competitive advantage of Tanzania's manufactured products, and the surge in Chinese manufacturing imports. Despite the results being contrary to expectations, they may help Tanzanian policymakers to obtain a clear view of what ought to be done to strengthen the manufacturing sector, as the country is in the process of crafting 2025/2050 Development Plan with a focus of transforming manufacturing sector into a key driver of economic growth. Tanzania has just started implementing its Third Five-Year Development Plan (2021/22–2025/26) with industrialisation as one of the focal areas.

First, Tanzania has the potential to gain from the EAC-RTA in terms of increasing its exports and improving the manufacturing sector. For EAC to positively impact Tanzania's manufacturing sector and enable it to attain competitiveness, the study recommends cross-cutting sectoral interventions for promoting investments in manufacturing activities (e.g., investment incentives), interventions that reduce the costs of operations (investing in and operating manufacturing enterprises and running businesses while striving to acquire and use advanced technologies). Thus, Tanzania should strive to promote industrialization to realise the goals envisaged in her development vision. This may include improvement of the industrial sector in terms of skilled labour, financial policy (facilitating mobilisation and access to long-term investment in manufacturing), capacity to capture key 'nodes' on the value chain, and technological improvement (ICT, e-commerce), which would enhance the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Competitiveness could also be realised through reduced operating costs, which would be made possible through public investment in physical infrastructure for transport and communication as well as energy.

Secondly, the study recommends capitalization of the agro-processing industries in Tanzania. The agro-processing industries in Tanzania are characterised by low-capital and affected by poor infrastructural development, especially in the rural areas. Capitalising agro-processing industries will strengthen the manufacturing sector in Tanzania. Tanzania has the potential to grow its manufacturing sector in food processing, textiles, and the production of leather goods. Engagement of small-scale agro-processing industries in EAC intra-block trade provides an opportunity for growth of the manufacturing sector.

Thirdly, the study recommends review of the China-EAC economic partnership to encourage more Chinese investors to invest within the East Africa region. This review

will give China's investors direct access to the East African market, given the rules-of-origin principle. In addition, given the strategic area of the EAC and other regional agreements, the investment partnership will lead to access the wider market of the great lakes' region and the SADC. As well, this partnership will allow EAC member states to benefit in terms of technology absorption and growth of manufacturing.

Fourthly, the study recommends strengthening the participation of Tanzanian EPZ projects in the EAC-RTA. EPZ was created to promote exports through technology transfer, export-oriented industrialisation, and creating value chain addition to domestically-produced agricultural goods. Currently, the EPZ project boosts Tanzania's exports of apparel to the United States through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). However, the trade potential in EAC is left untapped. As much as RTAs are important in increasing the participation of a country in international trade, the benefits to a country are predicated on what it trades. The study urges Tanzania to focus on gaining market access for manufactured products in the regional markets. Stakeholders in the manufacturing sector and the ministry of trade are urged to come up with strategies that will enable Tanzania to trade more of its manufactured products in the region. Consolidating EPZ to capture the EAC market by investing and attracting FDI in manufactured products will allow regional trade to impact the manufacturing sector in Tanzania, which will allow Tanzania to diversify from exporting minerals and primary agricultural goods such as cereals to manufactured goods.

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Imperialism and the Relevance of Constructivist Approach to the Analysis of International Relations

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Abstract

In international relations analysis, rationalism has remained the dominant approach for a long time. In recent years, however, new approaches have challenged the hegemony of rationalist empiricism in the analysis of international relations. One of these alternative approaches is the constructivist approach. Constructivism argues for the importance of ideational units of analysis such as history, knowledge, and identity in the making of individual and state interests which lead to actions and policy. This paper applies discourse analysis in reviewing two major texts on how the history of capitalist imperialism shaped the relations between the North and the South. The paper shows the weakness of rationalist approaches to international relations research. Rationalism presents states as atomistic actors pursuing their military and economic power interests in a historically given space without regard for the ideational and historical factors deciding the nature of this space. The paper concludes that the relevance of the constructivist approach to international relations research, which is sometimes vehemently criticized, is seen in its ability to identify and apply important historical units of analysis that are normally overlooked and even deliberately discarded in rationalist international relations analysis.

Keywords:

Constructivism, imperialism, history, north-south relations, underdevelopment.

1. Introduction

Rationalism in the study of international relations overlooks many important variables that inform the nature of relations among nations. Rationalist approaches to international relations have mainly focused on military and economic power and have presented states as atomistic actors that competitively seek to promote their interests and dominate other actors. These approaches take the condition of nations for granted. Nations are analyzed as given without consideration for other factors that may have led to the type of nations we have today and their relative positions internationally in terms of military and economic power. The analytical starting point of these rationalist theories is the actions of states. Ideational historical factors are not given priority. Nevertheless, ideational variables are important factors that inform the nature of international relations (Reus-Smit, 2005; Doty, 1996). In addition, Doty (ibid.) argues:

The question of representation has historically been excluded from the academic study of international relations...Representations of economic and military power differences, however, take place within political and social circumstances in which other kinds of differences are explicitly or implicitly presumed...the

historical construction and consequences of these differences have not been considered legitimate realms of inquiry. This exclusion has in many instances resulted in the complicity of international relations scholarship with particular constructions of the South and of the "reality" of the South's place in international relations (pp. 4 – 5).

Alternative theoretical thinking and analytical frameworks in international relations research arise as researchers discover new (or overlooked) parameters and variables. Sometimes these variables and parameters are deliberately left out of scholarly discussions as rationalist researchers consider them less important or unscientific. In some extreme cases scholars are deliberately biased towards certain world views, cultural orientations and even political stances. For many years, theories of international relations have particularly leaned towards Western epistemological order denying views and histories of people from other societies the chance to feature in international relations discussions (Doty, 1996; Reus-Smit, 2005). Theories like Realism (Donnelly, 2005), Liberalism (Burchill, 2005) and the English School (Linklater, 2005) are all based on Western rationalist understanding of international relations. They all have dominated the study of international relations but none of them considers factors such as representational practices and imperialism to be important units of analysis.

Epistemological order decides the nature of a theory. In general, all theories develop their assumptions informed by specific and particular social-cultural parameters or 'frameworks' (Brohman, 1995). This is what we refer to when we talk of the epistemological order of a theoretical perspective. Western epistemology therefore refers to the method of knowledge creation, development, promotion, and dissemination which presupposes the adequacy or usefulness (sometimes exclusively) of European and American cultural settings and historical experiences. When this stance is used to suggest the superiority of the European way and method of looking at, analyzing and describing social reality, the term Eurocentrism is commonly used (Amin, 2009; Willis, 2005). It is the emergence of views from parts of the world other than Europe and America that has labeled this western epistemology as Eurocentric.

Nsamenang (2005) has argued that mainstream Euro-American ethnocentrism is clearly reflected in development views that are presented as being applicable to all of human diversity. Nasr el-Din (2003) has called Western understanding of the world as the 'western mind' and has (dis)qualified it as having a duality as it is both exclusionary and hegemonic. As Pieterse (2010) has indicated "in social science it is now widely assumed that realities are socially constructed. The way people think and talk about social realities affects agendas, policies, laws and the ways laws are made and interpreted. Just as perception does not merely register but shape reality, knowledge does not simply reflect but constructs reality. Knowledge is political, shaping perceptions, agendas, policies" (p.2). This argument supports the position that international relations theory cannot be complete without acknowledging that international policies are a result of particularities and specifics of knowledge creation and human perceptions of reality.

One important unit of analysis that has significantly contributed to the construction of the nature of relations between the North and the South is the concept of imperialism. Yet, the concept of imperialism has received unfair treatment in most of the Eurocentric

major theories of international relations like Realism, Liberalism and the English school. At the same time, imperialism is a historical reality that informs the political and economic position of the South. Constructivism has taken an approach that unearths and analyzes such important but omitted (sometimes deliberately) parameters and relates them to normativism and materialism in international relations. This article aims to review major arguments on imperialism as presented in two major works that have employed the methodological approach of constructivism – a work by Roxanne Doty titled *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North South Relations* and another by Walter Rodney titled *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Imperialism is used as an example of a crucial determinant of the structure of international relations which has been obscured through empiricism that overlooks ideational historical factors.

2. The constructivist method

Recent debates in the study of International Relations have involved constructivists against rationalists and constructivists against critical theorists. Relative to all the parties involved, constructivism seems to be the youngest incomer that draws its essence from both normativism and materialism. It is therefore worthy re thinking its contribution to the method and approach to International Relations research. As Reus-Smit (2005) has put it:

Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures (p. 188).

This statement summarizes and qualifies the ontological and epistemological bases of both Doty (1996) and Rodney (1973). While both authors describe and analyze the role of history in shaping North South relations, Doty puts normative considerations (particularly the construction of identity through representational practices) on the fore front of her research on the causes of the relatively weaker position of southern nations in relation to the northern nations. On the other hand, Rodney uses Marxist analysis of material and production relations in deriving the cause of this political and economic reality. For both authors, agents are colonialists and their forerunners, large international corporations, biased scholars as well as religion. In addition, to both authors, imperialism is at the center of the discussion.

Major propositions of constructivism include the following: First, both material and ideational or normative structures (ideas, beliefs, and other cultural values) are equally important in shaping the behavior and actions of political actors. Economic and Military power do not have any other meaning than that they derive from structures of shared meanings in a given society (Viotti & Kaupi, 2012). Second, political action depends on the choice of interests, and the choice of interests derives from identity. People act according to their interests and their interests are formed through how they identify themselves in relation to others. In turn, identity formation depends on ideas of what is right and what is wrong. Third, just as Marxists, constructivists are structuralists (Linklater, 2005). They believe that ideas shape interests and actions and knowledgeable action leads to structures. Hence agents and structures are both results of shared ideas. It is therefore a continuum of ideas, identities, interests, actions, and structures. In

addition, the unit of analysis for constructivists is widened to include the agency of individuals in shaping international relations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).

While recognizing the role of materialism in informing the structure and relative position of nations in international relations, constructivism takes a backward contemplative step. It asks the important question: what makes people develop certain specific beliefs about themselves and about others and how does this inform the actions we observe in empirical studies? While empirical positivist methods stop at observing action to explain international relations phenomena, constructivism includes in its analysis the role of social processes in determining the nature of international relations. The actual reality of relations among nations is a construction of historical social processes heavily informed by interests developed from people's perceptions of themselves vis a vis other people.

3. Defining imperialism

Imperialism was first broadly defined as 'the highest stage of capitalism' (Lenin, 1968). In Lenin's analysis, the possibilities and means for further expansion of capitalism had been exhausted in Europe and more space was sought beyond the borders. An elaboration of this definition is given in Amin (1976). According to him:

Imperialism, in Lenin's sense of the word, made its appearance when the possibilities of capitalist development on the old basis had been exhausted, through the completion of the first Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America. A fresh geographical extension of capitalism's domain then became necessary (p. 187).

This definition has its basis on the Marxist analysis of capitalism and the evolution of economic modes of production. It presupposes historical and material metamorphosis of the capitalist mode of production particularly in Europe in the 19th century. Yet, imperialism is not only a historical concept. It is as much a behavioral concept entailing human agency. The same policies that may have been accepted and used in transforming human society, may change and become imperialistic and unacceptable. This is when these policies start to have notable and practical negative effects on the cause of development and well-being of people of other societies.

The impending and looming threat of imperialism is always there whenever there is an issue that brings the North and the South face to face. Imperialism has a long history but it is never a thing of the past. It is an element of reality to be considered every time the South enters into any form of dialogue with the North. The danger lingers heavily in the air of any agreements, dialogues or contracts between the two major parts of the globe because of the possibility that policies with seemingly good intentions may eventually turn imperialistic. The following passage by Tandon (2009) succinctly summarizes this argument in saying that:

...under the title 'Food Investment, not Imperialism', an editorial in the London Financial Times of 13 May 2008 advocated foreign investments as a solution to the problem of food crisis. However, having expounded on the virtue of what it called 'cross-border farm investment'... it goes on with what we cannot but agree. It says: The only exception is if investment in agriculture turns into imperialism. That is a practice with a long and unpleasant history, from the

plantation agriculture of the European empires to the 1954 coup in Guatemala, assisted by the US Central Intelligence Agency, at least in part for the benefit of the United Fruit Company. A developing country can suffer if capital-intensive cash crops are produced at the expense of labor-intensive food. Sadly, history is often forgotten by those who are in a hurry to sign free trade agreements, economic partnership agreements, donor aid loans and grants, and bilateral investment treaties (p.99).

The use of the term 'imperialism' is common in Marxist analysis but rare in other approaches to the analysis of international relations. Actually, the term has been outcasted as an unscientific term. In most discourses the term imperialism has been replaced with other terms that are accepted as being more scientific and objective. Purely economic terms like "international capital" or "transnational capital" have been used in the place of imperialism. This use of purely technical terms obscures the agential role of states and state politics, diplomacy and armies. But in any practical sense of the word, 'imperialism is precisely an amalgamation of the requirements and laws for the reproduction of capital; the social, national, and international alliances that underlie them; and the political strategies employed by these alliances' (Amin. 2009, pp.209-210). According to Rodney (1973), The "penetration of foreign capitalism on a world-wide scale from the late 19th century onwards is what we call 'imperialism'" (p. 208).

Imperialism has been described as a pioneer of capitalism (Warren, 1980). Imperialism is born when capitalism refuses to admit its obvious practical limitations and seeks expansion to other societies, not through negotiation but through the use of violent force or manipulation. Once introduced to other societies, imperialism has proven to be an evil hunting dog for capitalism, set out to devastate other societies on behalf of the capitalist expansionist projects around the world. The result has been the underdevelopment of these imperialized societies (Gunder, 1969). To Frank, underdevelopment is another word for 'dependent development'. Actually, dependency is the major terminology describing relations between the poorer South and the richer North in Southern neo-Marxist analyses. This terminology describes the condition that imperialism has created in the former colonies, a condition that makes the economies of the Southern nations subordinated to the needs of the North.

This expansion of capitalism towards the South led to serious negative results in Southern economies. It caused underdevelopment and dependency in the South while benefiting the North. One of the major elements that brought together the nations of the South in Bandung in 1955 was a common history of denied rights. These rights to full self-determination and agency in international relations were denied through the exploitative system of European, Japanese, and American imperialism. Despite their many differences in culture and historical trajectories, these countries were united into what has been referred to as the Non-Aligned Movement – unanimously rejecting Western globalization and its attendant policies (Amin, 2015). Amin had argued earlier that 'capitalism was not destined to be only a European phenomenon. However, Europe, having invented it first, subsequently began interfering with the normal evolution of other continents' (Amin, 2009, p.222).

Both Underdevelopment and dependency have remained as the realities of the Southern nations. The economies of these southern nations were underdeveloped through imperial conquests, slave trade and colonialism. Leys and Saul (2006) have argued, dependency has not been resolved. It has remained a reality of contemporary relations between the North and the South. In this unequal relationship, the South continues to pay a high price for the historical impact of Northern imperialism. The current structure of international relations reflects the original reason why these Southern nations were colonized: 'the production of primary commodities for export, and the creation of an infrastructure of railways, roads, ports and telecommunications orientated to exports (to Europe), not the promotion of an integrated national economy...' (ibid. p. 2006).

It is worth noting here that most of these Southern neo-Marxists belong to the Dependency School and have made several critical arguments supporting dependency Theory – which is a counter-theory to the Northern Modernization Theory. The arguments of dependency Theory are very similar to the positions of both Rodney and Doty. About North-South relations, the Dependency theory argues that:

Euro-North America and those other regions sowed the seeds of underdevelopment by siphoning off natural and human resources. This is what has created coloniality, a global power structure sustained by asymmetrical power relations, hegemonic epistemology, racial hierarchization of human species, and an exploitative world economy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017, p.35).

4. Imperialism and the Effect of Imperial Encounters in Rodney (1973)

According to Rodney (1973) each time two societies of different levels of development come into contact with each other, entirely new patterns are created in the rate and character of change in each of them. From this general observation, the author proposes two general rules. The first rule is that the society experiencing lower levels of development will be adversely affected. This adverse effect is directly related to the gap in development between the two societies. Sometimes this contact may lead to the complete extinction of the economically weaker society as was the case when Europeans came into contact with America and the Caribbean. The second rule applies when the extinction does not occur but the two societies continue to exist side by side. In this case, the general rule is that the economically weaker society can resume its independent development only when it advances to an economic level which is higher compared to the economic level of the economy that had dominated it previously. If it proceeds to a level higher than that of the economy that had previously dominated it. Such instances of this second rule can be traced to the history of Russia and China.

Africa's position in international relations is presented in Rodney (ibid.) as having been constructed through a historical process of underdevelopment. Africa was forcefully put at this position through colonialism and the slave trade. The imperial coming of Europeans to Africa caused Africa's underdevelopment. When the Europeans arrived in Africa, they found that African societies were prosperous and with much potential for further development. In some cases, African societies were found to be even better developed than many other parts of the world at that time. Nevertheless, the inability of Africans to resist domination, gave the Europeans an upper hand and they established political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony over this part of the world. The contact was imperial in that these Europeans used this opportunity to forcefully expand

capitalism to Africa through political and economic domination using exploitative policies. The underdeveloped position of Africa in international relations has never been resolved ever since.

A typical underdeveloped economy is not allowed to direct its economic efforts to sectors that will generate economic growth. Its economy is also not internally integrated between one sector and another. The links between such basic sectors as agriculture and industry are deliberately severed to disallow meaningful growth. This is why any nation with a history of being colonized lacks any 'hope of developing until it breaks effectively with the vicious circle of dependence (p. 39)'. Political freedom has not been able to resolve this economic quagmire. Nations that suffered the perils of imperialism still carry a heavy burden on their shoulders. Their economies are still linked perversely to the economies of the North through aid, unequal terms of trade, and other means of capitalist neo colonialism.

The agents of imperils capitalism are also known. In Africa, for example, imperialism penetrated through religious and educational institutions. Culturally, these institutions were used to foster imperialism and keep 'underdeveloped countries integrated into the capitalist system'. Both the Christian Church and universities in Africa have been used as means of cultural domination to pave the way for capitalist imperialism. Particularly, education institutions have been infiltrated in ways that result in the production of 'Africans to service the capitalist system and to subscribe to its values' (p.39). The mindsets of colonized people are yet to free themselves of the shackles of the complex of inferiority imposed on them forcefully through imperial deculturalization.

Rodney argues that, the important question that should be answered as we discuss or analyse relations between the North and the South is the question of 'who and what is responsible for African underdevelopment'. According to Rodney, this question can be answered in two levels. In level one the answer is found on the historical operations of the capitalist-imperialist system. The system 'bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly' (p.42). In the second level, any analysis of this situation must focus of the agents of imperialism. These are the ones who manipulate the system and are accomplices to it.

The current economic, military and political features of the relatively poorer and weaker South are 'ramifications of underdevelopment and of the exploitation of the imperialist system'. Yet, 'in most analyses' of the contemporary situation of international relations between the North and the South, these ramifications 'are either left out entirely or the whole concept of imperialism and neo-colonialism is dismissed as mere rhetoric, especially by 'academics' who claim to be removed from 'politics' (p. 41). In addition to the regard for the importance of history, Rodney emphasizes the importance of recognizing cultural differences in the analysis of international relational relations. He asserts that one of the results of colonialism and cultural imperialism is that people 'lacked due regard for the unique features of African culture' which have their own value that cannot be eclipsed by European culture 'because they are not really comparable phenomena' (p.48). When Europeans arrived in Africa, they constructed the image of Africans as uncivilized people that needed to be civilized (by force and manipulation).

This perception of Africans led to the kind of policies that were thereafter applied on colonized societies. Just as it has been argued earlier, knowledge and perceptions constructed a social reality for the dominated Africans.

Imperialism has always been a hypocritical process of expanding the influence of exploitative capitalism. When anti-slavery was held and promoted as the reason for the overthrow of some of African rulers in West, Central, North and South Africa, the real political motivation was deliberately obscured. The real reason for their overthrow 'was that they stood in the way of Europe's imperial needs. It was the only factor that mattered, with anti-slaving sentiments being at best superfluous and at worst calculated hypocrisy' (p.210). Rodney has correctly argued that 'Europe's power increased with imperialism because imperialism meant investments, and investment (which) gave European capitalists control over production within each continent' (p.222).

In terms of taking responsibility for the construction of knowledge, Rodney argues that many African writers are involved in reporting on recent pre-colonial period, particularly the history of nationalist struggles. Nevertheless, the coming of imperialism has not yet been seriously pursued from an African viewpoint' (p. 224). Rodney argues that the reason studies on early African history are lacking is first, that colonialists regarded African history as of no value worthy of reconstruction and second, 'that studies of Africa were mainly carried out by European bourgeois anthropologists, whose philosophical outlook on 'primitive societies' caused them to separate African society from its historical context (p.108). It is this methodological gap that necessitates studies that focus on ideational factors like history and culture to analyse and explain relations between the North and the South.

Another major negative effect of imperialism in the South is that of deliberate de-industrialization of the southern societies. Imperialism blocked the possibility of growth for African industries. In the words of Rodney: 'European industrialists did not welcome even the simple stage of processing groundnuts into oil on African soil'. The result was that, throughout colonial Africa, irrational contradictions arose regarding the general economic logic. Countries like Sudan and Uganda, which grew cotton, were subjected to the necessity of importing manufactured cotton goods instead of processing their own cotton. Likewise, countries that grew cocoa could not process the cocoa but had to import tinned cocoa and chocolate (p.335).

Not only that imperialism blocked industrial development in the South, but imperialism was also a serious interruption on the process of development for the South in general. Although Westerners imposed colonial administration in many nations of the South, such important steps as technology transfer were not given priority. According to Rodney, it would be logical for the colonial administration to compensate the colonized nations for that imperial interruption through the provision of modern industrial techniques... 'however, those techniques were debarred from Africa, based on the international division of labour under imperialism' (p.360). This was a deliberate effort to deny Africa the potential to compete against European industries.

5. Imperialism and the Effect of Imperial Encounters in Doty (1996)

While Rodney uses the term 'contact' Doty uses the term 'encounter' but the logic is the same. It implies the coming into contact between the Northern agents of capitalism and the Southern societies through imperialism. She explains the coming into contact of the two 'societies' i.e., the North and the South in the following terms:

...the term encounter implies the presence of two entities (i.e., the North and the South), the term imperial encounters is meant to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct "realities" that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency (p.3).

In *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North South Relations* Roxanne Doty examined the labels and categorizations that have been – perhaps unnecessarily – accepted as standard or even legitimated as a mode of identifying different peoples of the world. She endeavored to review the historical events that characterized 'encounters' between the United States and Philippines on one side and between Great Britain and Kenya on the other. She uses various historical records that show how the North South relations were a factor that led to a particular type of social construction and foundation for developing particular kinds of policies. She borrows insight from poststructuralists like Edward Said and Michel Foucault among others. Using discourse analysis, the author arrives at a critical commentary of the role of such representational practices in shaping identities for both the South and the North through such division as developed/underdeveloped, civilized/uncivilized, modern/traditional or first world/third world. These resultant identities are then said to critically affect the North – South relations – which is one of the major areas of study in International Relations.

According to Doty, the practice of representation is done by politicians, journalists, and scholars/researchers. Doty shows that the resulting policies are shaped by these identities. The whole practice of labelling is presented as an issue of power relations. There is power asymmetry in that the North is able to actually create this reality as it wishes. The discourse that matters in this power relationship is that of the North. The northern views about civilization and human rights, for example, are used to define, permanently, the identities of 'others'. By using insights from Edward Said and others, Doty suggests that this representation practice defines discourses in social sciences and that there is need to expand the repository of analytical tools as well as theoretical tools used by students of global politics to include these emerging alternatives.

The use of interpretive methods is an important addition to the empirical positivist method. The inclusion of historical facts in the study and interpretation of relations among nations is also crucial. Doty and other constructivists have shown that there is a need to regard and include in our analysis of international relations the fact that there are cultural variations and distinctiveness in each society. These ideational and normative factors are an important starting point in international relations research. They help in telling us about the initial or original or start of the interests of actors. The relationship between analysis based on objectivity and the one that is based on subjective interpretation could be likened to a wrestling bout. The fighters will normally start their wrestling match with a process of labeling – both themselves and their opponents. This

is the psychological part of the fight but the final decision of the judges will be based on actual, physical muscular performance.

Labeling leads to policy and policy leads to political action and political action to relative position in international power relations. The South is where it is economically and socially because of what Southerners accepted as their relative identity vis a vis the other societies of the world. In most cases, this accepted identity was imposed through the consequences of imperial encounters such as colonialism, slave trade and neo-colonialism.

Just like Rodney (1973), Doty (1996) describes imperial encounters as involving two different entities. These entities are different in both history and economic levels. Another similarity in how the two authors describe imperial encounters lies in the fact that one of the entities (societies) is dominated and denied agency in international relations. One side (The North) develops and advances while the other (the South) is systematically weakened and underdeveloped. Doty proves that there is no such thing as good imperialism. Some authors, like Halle (1985) distinguish between two types of imperialism, the first type is what he calls rationalized imperialism. This is described as a responsible or unselfish domination. In this case, the conqueror has an obligation to lead the conquered society into civilization. The second type is irrational domination which implies wanton exploitation. But, as is shown in Rodney (1973)'s analysis, imperialism never led to any meaningful development in the South. Exploitation has always been the objective of all known imperial encounters. As we have indicated earlier, good policies can, at some point and for some reason, become imperialistic. Some of those who have opposed imperialism have argued that imperialism uses brute force, is inconsistent with democracy, and is nonprogressive concerning human development as it led to the enslavement of the nations (Jordan 1901).

In addition, Doty argues against the position taken by Halle by noting that:

What cannot be questioned is the right of conquest itself, which must be presumed prior to any other arguments or specifications. The Philippines and the Filipinos are represented alternatively as the prize of conquest, the object to be discovered, the subject without agency to be protected, improved, and rendered happy. The representation of the Philippines as Spain's "discovery" is a rhetorical strategy of negation implying a blank slate to be written on by Western power and knowledge (p. 35).

According to Doty, therefore, imperialism and imperialist policies are products of historical representational practices. She argues that the representational practices she discusses in her book were power practices that played a key role in the creation of the reality of international relations. She continues to argue that '...it is hard to imagine that the phenomenon of imperialism would have been possible in the absence of these kinds of representations' (p.72). To Doty, imperialism involves labeling, conquest, exploitation, and domination of others.

6. Relevance of the Constructivist Approach

We have shown that imperialism has been denied space in the analysis of international relations mostly by Eurocentric, bourgeois, and Western scholars who use rationalism in their analyses. These have tended to discard the constructivist approach as unrealistic

(Zehfuss, 2004). But, how can any honest scholar deny that the history of slavery and colonialism is unrealistic? How can anyone overlook the devastations caused by colonial policies to the economies of the South? Because of this weakness of the Western rationalist studies of international relations, constructivist approaches prove very relevant. The relevance of constructivism is seen in its ability to establish an analytical link between power, history, identity, truth, knowledge, interests, and political action.

In discussing the role of Western scholarship, Rodney (1973) argues that:

...omissions from the list of what bourgeois scholars think relevant are really overwhelming. No mention is made of the exploitation of the majority...of the social relations of production or of classes...of the way that the factors and relations of production combine to form a distinctive system or mode of production, varying from one historical epoch to another. No mention is made of imperialism as a logical phase of capitalism...However, one has at least to recognize the full human, historical and social dimensions of development (p. 18).

Rodney starts by indicating that the focus of the text is the contemporary situation of Africa. The book starts with a declaration of its purpose stating: 'This book derives from a concern with the contemporary African situation. It delves into the past only because otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the present came into being...(p. i)'. This approach of delving into history to understand the present is important because when history is not carefully and honestly consulted, reality is also misrepresented.

Roxanne Doty uses constructivist approach to challenge the established norms and accepted modes describing relations in international politics. To build her arguments, she employs some tools from social constructivists. According to this approach the political, social and economic relations between the countries of the South and the countries of the North is created or constructed through several years of active representational practices. These representational practices are said to have been able to construct enduring identities of both the North and the South. This is the dual result of the practice of representation. As they labelled others the northern colonial powers were able to create a desired identity for themselves. Doty argues that as a result, the North has been able to tell the world more about itself than even about the South that was being labeled in the first place.

Doty puts a lot of emphasis on analysing the process of labelling and its effect on human and state action. She does so because 'Thinking in terms of representational practices calls our attention to an economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking'. Dichotomies like 'Developed/ underdeveloped, "first world"/"third world," core/periphery, metropolis/ satellite, advanced industrialized/less developed, modern/traditional, and real states/quasi-states' are not natural but are constantly used to distinguish nations of the world. Thinking in terms of representation helps us to understand North South relations, not only as an area of theory and policy practice but a realm of politics in which 'the very identities of peoples, states, and regions are constructed' (p. 2). This way analysing international relations helps us to answer the difficult question why a civilized, democratic nation will engage in a process to conquer, plunder and enslave people of other nations in contrast to the very basic values of democracy and civilization.

Tucker (1977) argued that 'the history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence' and Doty adds that the problem of most analyses has been to take the problem of international inequality as a given state of affairs instead of a problem to be investigated. She continues to show the importance of isolating specific and identifiable historical facts about contacts between the North and the imperialized South and she calls these 'imperial encounters.' She defines these as 'Asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct "realities" that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency' (p. 3).

Reading a Marxist analysis along with a constructivist one has the advantage of answering two important epistemological questions. The first is what historical events led to the current nature of relations between the North and the South and the second is why did that happen. Any good analysis of international relations should not stop at describing the nature of these relations. It must go further and unearth the substantive reasons why things are the way they are. The history of imperialism in the South is a major factor explaining the relatively weaker position that the South holds in international relations. This history led to political, economic, military and even psychological ramifications that still haunt the Southern nations.

While Rodney uses economic (historical materialism) in his analysis of the historical relations between Africa and Europe, Doty uses historical representations (labeling) to analyze encounters between the North and the South – particularly drawing examples from Kenya and the Philippines. Nevertheless, both authors bank on historical facts and the detriments of imperialism negatively affecting the South and benefiting the North giving each their current relative positions in the international relations power chain. What is of common relevance for them is their constructivist approach to international relations – particularly relations between the global North and the global South. For Rodney, the analysis is Marxist in nature but the approach is constructivist. They both argue that the structure of relations between the North and the South is a social construction.

Rationalist theories of international relations are mostly mechanical and descriptive. They study reality presuming the presence of states in their current political and economic status without caring enough to ponder the underlying abstract factors that inform policy in international relations. The effects of imperialism are clearly 'material' but most of the major theories of international relations choose to be biased towards praising Western epistemology and degrading post modernism and constructivist approaches. Imperialism cannot be understood if it is not studied and it cannot be studied without regard for the sentiments of those who suffered and continue to suffer from its repercussions and ramifications. In addition, a major puzzle remains in any analysis of international relations how could the nations that boast of being able to define and promote equality, peace, democracy and civilization go ahead and subject the people of other societies to the very opposite of these values? This is what constructivist approaches dare to address.

The importance of reviewing the role and impact of imperialism in contemporary international relations lies in the fact that imperialism is not a thing of the past – as some

have dared to posit. Recent literature shows that imperialism is a significant component of Western foreign policy. For example, Minkinnen (2004) has argued strongly against the human rights and democracy implications of Bush administration's expansionist policies premised and implemented through the pretext of War on Terror. According to this author the Bush administration introduced a new form of imperialism as the policies backing America's advances against perceived sponsors and instigators of terrorism also created a new way of perceiving the so called 'Non-White Others'. Eventually, the war on terror disposition replaces global governance based on relative consent of citizens with a new type of global governance based on the use of force and repression. This stance goes directly in contrast of human, personal and citizen rights. This new Bush Doctrine is said to imply a renovation of (the) imperialist urge on a global scale through the politics of pre-emptive new imperialism (p. 61).

Equally, Harvey (2003) supports the view of Michael Ignatieff, a columnist in the New York Times suggesting that America's entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism manifested in 'legions of soldiers, spooks and special forces straddling the globe' (p. 3). Major business corporations, particularly those involved in the oil business shape and enforce America's international political and military interests. Harvey provides vivid examples in the interference of America in the affairs of Venezuela and Iraq. In addition, the manifestation of a new form of global capitalistic imperialism is seen in the forced consent of various national governments to align with the wishes of capitalistic imperialism through imposed and coerced political and economic liberalization. Consequently, it can rightly be argued that the project of new imperialism is facilitated by the forces of globalization and granted agency by capitalistic military, economic and governmental institutions. The view that globalization is actually a manifestation of a new form of imperialism is shared by Chilcote (2003) who asserts that 'globalization can only be understood as a manifestation of imperialism and the devastating capitalist order' (p. 83).

Another manifestation of the new form of imperialism is seen in what Lorimer (2002) refers to as imperialist loans and imperialistic flow of international capital into semi colonial states of the third world. Western capitalistic hegemony engenders a kind of new Marshall Plan that pumps capital and aid into relatively poorer nations of the South but this new Marshall Plan does not allow for a meaningful development of a bourgeois class in these societies. Likewise, the imperialistic capital does not support the growth of local industries but forces the economies of the recipient nations to remain underdeveloped and subordinated to the capitalistic economies of the North.

7. Conclusion

In international relations, imperialism is a historical fact that can neither be misunderstood nor dismissed. Nor yet can it be praised for the progress of human societies. It is a historical reality forming the basis of contemporary exploitative and unequal relations between the North and the South. It is a perverse tendency not compatible with democracy or civilization. Those who claim its non-importance, do so simply because it is a reproach to the Northern nations which constantly make efforts to display a façade of democracy and civilization. To Southern political analysts, imperialism is an important unit of analysis for explaining the agential inadequacy of the Southern nations in international relations. Imperialism is savage, barbaric, exploitative conquest,

plunder, and domination. It implies the use of unacceptable and undemocratic means of making capitalism achieve its expansionist goals. Historically, imperialism has been the cause of proxy wars, economic raids, looting of resources like minerals and timber, colonialism, and slave trade. Imperialism is never negotiated.

One of the strongest points in Doty's and Rodney's analyses is that of relating the history of nations to the reality of the detriments of imperialism. Some have claimed that imperialism is a mere Marxist jargon that cannot be related to actual historical events, while others have argued that capitalistic imperialism had a positive economic impact on the societies that experienced encounters with more advanced European economies¹. But the historical reality is that imperialism has always been imposed on people. It has never been positive in its consequences. It is imperialism that led to colonialism and the slave trade. Imperialism is about the conquest and subjugation of peoples of the world by those, at the time, militarily and economically more powerful. Not all encounters are imperial but there are, continually, instances of imperial encounters in many forms, and their attendant policies have never been progressive!

It may be logical for the Northern hegemonic epistemological order to suppress the use of imperialism in the analysis of international relations because, historically, imperialism has given their societies the economic and political advantage that they currently enjoy. On the contrary, the Southern scholarship can't overlook imperialism in their analysis of international relations because of the high existential price that their societies have to pay, continually, as a result of the detriments of imperialism.

Critics of the concept of imperialism as a unit of analysis in international relations need to learn that it is imperialism that put the South in its present place of disadvantage in terms of power and influence. In the same vein, critics of constructivist approaches to the analysis of international relations need to see the ability of the approach to bring to light such an important unit of analysis that lay obscure due to deliberate overlooks of mainly Western rationalistic empiricism. Effective and honest analysis of relations between the North and the South must imperatively endeavor to answer the question of why and by which historical agency the nature of these relations came into being.

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¹ Bauer (1981) went as far as arguing that imperialism never did any harm to the colonized economies but rather improved them through connecting them to markets that were necessary for development.

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Global Governance, Energy Policies and Security of Supply of Liquefied Petroleum Gas in Tanzania

By

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Abstract

Energy security is important for human development and welfare. Governance regimes at both global and country levels are crucial for the realization of energy security. This study highlights the role of global governance for security of supply of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in Tanzania. Specifically, the study examines the effect of global governance on the development of the liquefied petroleum gas sector in Tanzania and proposes strategies for improving the development of liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania. The study adopted the qualitative research design and underpinned by action research approach. Key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions were used to collect primary qualitative data, while review of documents was done to provide secondary data and triangulate findings. A sample of 30 respondents was purposively selected among policy makers as well as other private and public sector actors. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data. The findings establish that the low level of LPG supply security in the country is contributed to by both national energy policies and global energy governance. It was further found that global governance affects the LPG energy security in Tanzania due to the selective nature of global energy governance institutions. The study recommends that in order to improve the LPG energy security in Tanzania, clear and implementable policies as well as encouragement of public private partnership should be given priority. The study further recommends that Tanzania should strengthen essential elements such as technology, expertise and infrastructures to attract more investors in LPG.

Key words:

Energy policy, energy security, global governance, Liquefied Petroleum Gas.

1. Introduction

Energy security has become a key subject related to the survival and wellbeing of the people in both developed and developing nations (Alemzero, et al, 2021). Recent natural gas discoveries in Sub-Saharan Africa are creating development opportunities. At the same time, the increased global interest in energy is forcing developing countries to choose policy strategies that either prioritize domestic consumption or export of energy resources. The strategy that a government chooses affects the overall energy security of that country. In addition, enhancing energy security for developing countries is more than securing investment to respond to global energy demand. For example, Hache (2018) has shown how renewable energies improve energy security in developing countries. The author found also that energy security is increasingly becoming a major

focus in the world today but also that, for developing countries, energy security is limited by lack of access to resources and critical infrastructure.

Countries formulate policies to ensure stable access to energy for their people. Energy policy cuts across a variety of globally important issues including environmental, geopolitical, economic, political and developmental issues (Azzuni and Breyer, 2018). Le and Nguyen (2019) pointed out that access to energy is not only crucial in supporting the provision of basic needs such as food, lighting, water, and essential health care, but it is first and foremost a precondition to economic growth, political stability and prosperity. According to Christoffersen (2016), there are five aspects of energy security including availability, accessibility, acceptability, affordability, and develop-ability.

In 1974, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created to ensure secure and affordable energy supplies. It conducts analyses on current and future risks for oil supply disruption, emerging gas security challenges, and increasing system flexibility and resilience of the electricity sector (Azzuni and Breyer, 2018; Alemzero, et al., 2021). Other organizations have been set up with an energy policy function at global level. Gökgöz and Güvercin (2018) found that, there are institutions which set rules and standards including the World Trade Organization (WTO), Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They aim at establishing legislation on rule setting for market exchange or the global climate change regime (Gasser, 2020). In spite of this global arrangement, countries set up country – specific energy governance regimes with a level of governance autonomy which, at times, may go against the global governance standards and complicate energy governance in general. For instance, Christoffersen (2016) argues that, global energy governance institutions encouraged China – which has ungoverned domestic energy spaces – to reform and strengthen its capacity for domestic energy governance. Rather than reform, China has attempted to create an alternative global energy order and established a leadership role using the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) framework. But BRICS exists in the global ungoverned energy space and has not prioritized global energy governance.

In Tanzania, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) market demand has experienced considerable growth over the past decade, with consumption increasing from 30,000 metric tons in 2010 to approximately 150,000 metric tons in 2021. This growth can be attributed to several factors, including the country's expanding economy, urbanization, and the Tanzanian government's efforts to promote LPG as a cleaner, more sustainable energy source. In addition, Tanzania's strategic location on the Indian Ocean makes it an attractive hub for LPG imports and distribution within the East African region (Ndunguru & Lema, 2020; Bishoge, et al, 2018). The government has played a crucial role in promoting the growth of the LPG sector through various policy initiatives and regulatory measures. Key government agencies involved in the sector include the Ministry of Energy which is responsible for energy policy formulation, monitoring, and regulation. There is also the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) which is the primary regulatory body overseeing LPG operations, including licensing, pricing, and safety standards (Chuwa& Perfect-Mrema, 2023). Tanzania like many other developing countries has been facing some challenges in the LPG sector. For instance, Ndunguru & Lema, (2020) mentioned quantity of sell, household income,

household size, and the level of awareness as key challenges facing LPG sector in the country. On the other hand, Bishoge, et al, (2018) pointed out that availability of fuel, canister size, financing of first costs and refilling costs and transportation are constraints to the LPG sector in Tanzania.

Global energy governance as constructed by the developed countries has been criticized as inadequate to meet numerous challenges (Kober, et al, 2020; Tanzania Renewable Energy Policy Handbook, 2022 Update; Tanzania Energy Congress, 2022). Yet, the effects of global governance on energy security and in particular LPG security in developing countries has not been systematically analysed. Some related studies include Rocco, et al, (2021) who examined enhancing energy models with geo-spatial data for the analysis of future electrification pathways, and Simpson, et al, (2021) who investigated the adoption rationales and effects of off-grid renewable energy access for African youth. To fill this gap, the study examined the effect of global governance in LPG Energy Security in Tanzania.

2. Background of Energy Security Governance

Energy security as an area of study emerged following the 1970s' oil predicaments. Global energy governance then emerged as a new crosscutting policy agenda, which seeks solutions to energy poverty, and also addresses issues of energy justice, energy and economic development, nuclear proliferation, resource management, and climate change (Gasser, 2020). Wang and Zhou (2017) reveal that energy security enhances economic growth for both developed and developing countries. On the other hand, energy insecurity – measured by energy intensity and carbon intensity – has a negative impact on economic growth (Khattak, Lee, Bapujee, Tan, Othman, AbdRasid, & Kazi, 2018). This means that at the global level, energy for economic development, energy security, and climate change mitigation should be approached as integrated themes since there are linkages among these three agendas.

According to UNIDO (2020) the global energy governors are intergovernmental organizations such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Energy Agency (IEA) as well as international nongovernmental organizations such the World Resources Institute, multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, and regional organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). These organizations have specialized in the issues of energy and they have conducted relevant activities and are involved in current efforts. Nevertheless, global energy security is put at risk by the uneasy relationship between the international political system and the international energy system. The political framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created to manage energy security in the developed world and the relations with producing countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Christoffersen (2016).

3. LPG Governance

Evidence shows that countries have forged their own policy regimes to govern the development and security of LPG supply. In Malaysia, Oh, et al (2018) reported that, since the Malaysian government started to emphasize on the use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), energy security has been assured for more that 60 percent. This was necessary as part of its energy reform to implement a more common energy regulatory

framework involving all relevant agencies to safeguard a secured and sustainable energy future. Moreover, Shackleton, Sinasson, Adeyemi and Martins (2022) reported that developed by the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), South Africa's Liquefied Petroleum Gas Rollout Strategy has been approved by Cabinet with the objective of advancing the domestic industry and expand the application of LPG in diversifying the energy mix. This has ensured energy security in general and energy affordability in particular.

Current LPG consumption in West Africa is estimated to be about 360,000 tons per year. Utilization of LPG as household fuel has been expanding in several countries in West Africa since the early 1990s, but average per capita consumption in the region remains low by international standards (Doggart, Ruhinduka, Meshack, Ishengoma, Morgan-Brown, Abdallah & Sallu 2020). The most common household fuels in West Africa are wood and charcoal (Alemzero, et al, 2021). In Sub-Saharan Africa one finds the highest deficit in clean energy access proportional to population: only 12 percent of Africans had access to clean cooking fuels and technologies in 2014. The increase since 2012 in the number of people living without LPG access is also mainly driven by Africa's population growth rates, where each year the population expands by 25 million, while access to clean cooking increases by only 4 million (World Bank, 2017). According to Ofosu-Peasah, Antwi & Blyth (2021) LPG has influenced energy security in West Africa characterized by investment, governance, sustainability, reliability, affordability, regional energy pools, energy demand-side management and oil and gas availability and security. The study concludes that energy security in both the Global North and West Africa has been influenced by investing in LPG (Cader, Pelz, Radu, & Blechinger (2018).

These country – specific energy security policies are, nevertheless, implemented in the face of a complex global governance that may, at times, limit the success of these policies. For example, Brazil implemented its first energy efficiency policies more than four decades ago after the oil price shocks of the 1970s. However, the strategies have had only a limited impact and the country continues to lag behind others at both global level and the Latin American region. To ensure energy security, Brazil has been prioritizing Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) sector as reported by Carvalho, et al (2020).

A report by National Energy Policy - NEP (2015) showed that Tanzania has abundant energy resources which include natural gas, coal, uranium, hydro, biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, tidal and waves. In 2010, the energy consumption composed of residential (72.5 percent); industry (14.4 percent); transport (5.8 percent); agriculture (4.2 percent) and others (3.1 percent). Coal reserve is estimated at 1.9 billion tonnes of which 25 percent is proven. Only 12 percent of the hydro potential of about 4.7 GW has been utilized (Gill-Wiehl, Sievers, & Kammen, 2022). The average solar insolation is about 200 Wp/m² and several sites with wind speed ranging from 5 to 9 m/s have been observed. Tanzania has confirmed uranium deposits of about 200 million pounds.

The national energy balance indicates dominance of biomass use in the form of charcoal and firewood and its contribution to the total national energy consumption is about 85 percent. Petroleum products contribute about 9.3 percent of the total energy consumed while electricity accounts for 4.5 percent and 1.2 percent from coal and renewable energies. Charcoal consumption mainly in urban areas has nearly doubled over the past

ten years due to urbanisation, high prices or scarcity of other alternatives particularly kerosene, electricity and LPG. It is projected that demand for charcoal, without supply and demand side interventions will double by 2030, from approximately 2.3 million tonnes of charcoal in 2012.

Tanzania relies on several energy resources for its power generation. About 45% of the country's electricity comes from hydro (Kichonge, 2018). However, poor rains in the past few years led to water shortages that affected the turbines generating electricity. Bishoge, Zhang, Mushi, Suntu, and Mihuba (2018) argue that Tanzania has embarked on a deliberated measure to forge an energy mix which will ensure reliable availability of power for the economy. This deliberate measure involves promotion of increased use of renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, biomass, wastes, micro hydro), natural gas and other locally available energy sources including coal and geothermal. As of the year 2021 Tanzania's total electricity supply was 1,605.86 MW (Michael, Tjahjana & Prabowo, 2021). The Government has been promoting substitution of charcoal and firewood by providing tax relief to stimulate the use of LPG in the country. Over the past ten years, LPG supply for household cooking has increased significantly. The total volume of LPG imported in the financial year 2010/11 was 24,470 MT compared to 69,148 MT in the financial year 2014/15. The trend shows that the LPG market is growing rapidly especially in urban centres (NEP, 2015).

However, poor rains in the past few years led to water shortages that affected the turbines generating electricity. As such, Tanzania embarked on a deliberated measure to forge an energy mix which will ensure reliable availability of power for the economy. This deliberate measure involves promotion of increased use of renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, biomass, wastes, micro hydro), natural gas and other locally available energy sources including coal and geothermal. As of the year May 2023 Tanzania's total electricity supply was 1,872.05 MW.

The government of Tanzania has been taking various initiatives to ensure sustainability of the energy supply – especially LPG. The initiatives taken by the Government of Tanzania include the formulation of the National Energy Policy (2003) and the National Natural Gas Policy (2013). The Policies provide a framework aimed at promoting LPG as a clean and efficient energy source for cooking, heating, reducing deforestation, and improving public health by minimizing indoor air pollution. On top of that, the policies provide a framework on the removal of Value-Added Tax (VAT) and import duties on LPG as well as to make LPG more affordable for consumers to encourage its adoption (Chuwa & Perfect-Mrema, 2023). It is imperative, therefore, to ascertain the extent to which the policies are succeeding to mitigate various limitations facing the supply of LPG in the country and particularly how global governance affects the implementation of the policies and other strategies (Stilo, 2018).

4. LPG Governance

Developed by Kindleberger (1984), Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) indicates that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power, or hegemon. The key mechanisms in hegemonic stability theory revolve around public goods such as energy provision, i.e., to resolve collective action problems regarding public goods, a powerful actor who is willing and able to shoulder a

disproportionate share of public goods provision is needed (Gavris, 2022). Hegemonic stability theory entails self-reinforcing cooperation, as it is in the interest of the hegemon to provide public goods and it is in the interest of other states to maintain an international order from which they derive public goods (Hornat, 2021). The theory assumes that, developed countries wish to dominate the provision of public goods such as energy so that weak countries remain dependent on the powerful. In this case, global governance favours the powerful countries in the world, leaving behind the weak ones (Van de Graaf, Colgan, 2016). The situation has led to some countries finding various initiatives to ensure energy security especially LPG (Gavris, 2022; Noor, 2022). In the context of this study, the theory is useful as it shows how the super power countries affect energy accessibility, sustainability and affordability in the developing countries (Speight, 2019).

The issues of global governance and energy security in developing countries are related. According to Koenig-Archibugi (2019) global governance encompasses activities that transcend national boundaries at the international, transnational, and regional levels and is based on rights and rules that are enforced through a combination of economic and moral incentives. Barnett (2021) added that global governance brings together diverse actors to coordinate collective action at the global level. The goal of global governance is to provide global public goods, particularly peace and security, justice and mediation systems for conflict resolution, functioning markets and unified standards for trade and industry. The International Energy Agency (2020) presents energy security as having stable access to energy sources on a timely, sustainable and affordable basis. Enhancing energy security requires a strong energy sector based on a sound energy strategy and effective energy policies because energy security affects the political, economic, and social aspects of every country. According to Sovacool (2021), energy security is a multifaceted concept that involves ensuring the availability, affordability, reliability, and sustainability of energy sources, as well as protecting energy systems against physical, economic, and geopolitical threats. The Sovacool explains that energy security as the condition in which a nation, organization, or individual can remain to depend on a sufficient, affordable, and reliable energy supply while minimizing vulnerability to unexpected or harmful disruptions.

On the other hand, Fang, Shi and Yu (2018) have attempted to widen the scope of energy security to focus on the entire energy system, from primary energy resource acquisition to final energy consumption, and have proposed that energy security is not just about ensuring reliable supply of fuel, but also ensuring that there is reliable infrastructure in place to carry energy to the end user. Azzuni and Breyer (2018) also advocated for the consideration of geopolitical factors in energy security. They argued that energy security is not solely an economic or environmental issue, but also a geo-political issue with wide ranging implications for international relations, security, and power dynamics. This study is underpinned by the contention by Barnett (2021) that global governance brings together diverse actors of LPG to coordinate collective action to promote energy security in the world – in this case, in Tanzania.

5. Methodology

A qualitative action research study was conducted and data was collected through key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. Additional data was collected through documentary review. Action research creates opportunities for organizational learning

(Ivankova and Wingo (2018). A sample of 10 key informants was purposively selected to respond to semi-structured interviews. These were from institutions and public offices which play direct roles of overseeing and regulating energy in the country, including President Office of Regional and Local Government Administration (PO - RLGA), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Energy were interviewed because they are responsible in formulating policies related to energy in the country. Two Focused Group were conducted, each included 10 participants. Focused group discussions involved the officers from The Rural Energy Agency (REA), The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), Petroleum Bulk Procurement Agency (PBPA) and Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA). The qualitative data collected were analysed through thematic analysis technique. The information collected from various reports and policies about energy their content were analysed to validate information from the participants of interview and focus group discussion (Creswell, 2024).

6. Findings and Discussion

Respondents indicated that the LPG sector in Tanzania faced many challenges including high price and price fluctuations which lead to low usage of LPG among Tanzanians. Low-income families cannot afford the high price of LPG. It was further revealed that limited distribution network of LPG is another challenge facing Tanzania in LPG sector. Limited distribution network has resulted to the inadequate availability of the LPG in some places. In this way, the supply chain of LPG in general was said to be unreliable.

One of the officers from ORYX commented that:

“...as a country we have some challenges facing the LPG sector. If addressed, the country will achieve liquefied petroleum gas energy security. In my view, one of the serious challenges is inadequate policies that direct the community to use the liquefied petroleum gas. The use of firewood and charcoal continues thus compromising liquefied petroleum gas energy security in the country.”

Key informants from the policy making cadre indicated that the national strategies for improving liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania are in place. These include government policies and various strategic plans. This argument was supported by an officer from the Ministry of Energy in Tanzania who remarked that:

“...as a nation we have been striving to have national strategies for improving liquefied petroleum gas energy security in collaboration with other stakeholders both public and private. Therefore, my opinion is that we have national strategies for improving liquefied petroleum gas energy security but the problem is that this issue has to do with the complexity of global governance”

The findings indicates that one of the major effects of global governance on liquefied petroleum gas energy security in the Tanzania is unavailability of adequate liquefied petroleum gas thus affecting energy security. Global political propaganda has affected security of liquefied petroleum gas energy in the country by making the LPG price high. Because of this situation, there are few investors in LPG in the country despite the available opportunities (Synák, Čulík, Rievaj, & Gaňa, 2019). Commenting on the effect of global governance on liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania, an officer from REA argued said:

“...it is true that global governance has effect on liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania. The country has been striving to ensure energy security through the use of various energy sources like the liquefied petroleum gas. However, the strategies have been handicapped by global governance”.

The argument above is also supported by an officer from EWURA who said that,

“...it is important for the country to focus on economic and political diplomacy as means of accessing adequate liquefied petroleum gas from various countries in the world. This will ensure adequate supply of liquefied petroleum gas in the country thus realization of liquefied petroleum gas energy security.”

Yet another respondent said:

“...you know in most cases the liquefied petroleum gas is imported from other countries. This has made the availability and accessibility to be limited thus affecting its security. Therefore, limited availability and accessibility is what affects its security. In connection to the same, global governance has not prioritized the availability and accessibility of liquefied petroleum gas in developing countries like Tanzania.”

These findings support those by Fang, Shi and Yu (2018) who evaluated the sustainability of energy security in China. They reported that global governance affects the energy security in developing countries because there is no guarantee of availability and affordability. Since many developing countries depend on importing LPG from developed countries, they end up getting it at high price which affects the end users especially those from low-income families.

Moreover, key informants had the opinion that one of the effective strategies for improving the development of liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania is to ensure that there are effective energy policies that encourage the use of liquefied petroleum gas. On the other hand, the policies should discourage the use of charcoal and firewood. Findings reveal that the country needs to attract more investors in liquefied petroleum gas. This will ensure adequate production of liquefied petroleum gas thus energy security will be realized. The informant from Tanzania Traditional Energy Development Organization (TATEDO) offices commented that:

“...development of liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania depends solely on two kinds of national strategies. One is a strategy to attract investors to increase the production of liquefied petroleum gas. More production of liquefied petroleum gas guarantees its availability and affordability especially for poor households because prices will go down. The second is effective policies that encourage the use of liquefied petroleum gas.”

Kazimierz (2019) argued that, policies and fiscal incentives remain important for the development of energy on the African continent but are not the decisive factors. Kazimierz, suggests that international private participation in energy generation and renewable/wind energy expansion in Africa is critical and expected to increase. Nakanwagi (2021) suggests that policy focus should be on limiting the vulnerability to disruption and ensuring the provision of adequate supply for future increased demands. The problem of ensuring energy security is, therefore, not just confined to the dimensions

of supply and demand. Various emerging issues like global governance and cross-border energy interdependence have also been added to the risks of energy security.

Similarly, Kichonge (2018) argues that, good strategies that can be used for improving the development of liquefied petroleum gas security in Tanzania include the incorporating of various stakeholders into the LPG sector. Incorporating stakeholders can help to identify potential barriers and opportunities, enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of policies, and ensure the successful adoption of new technologies in LPG. In particular, Kichonge examined the geo - political and geo – economic implications of energy security in Africa. It is contended that addressing these issues requires a more nuanced understanding of the complex and dynamic interactions between politics, society, and energy, as well as an emphasis on inclusive and sustainable growth that benefits all parties.

It was equally proposed that international strategies for improving energy security should be adopted to the developing countries like the Tanzania corresponding to those put forward by Christoffersen (2016) who indicated that international strategies for improving energy security in the developing countries are not given priority. According to UNIDO (2020) there are six types of global energy governors: intergovernmental organizations such as UNDP and IEA, summit processes such as BRICS, international nongovernmental organizations such the World Resources Institute, multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, and regional organizations such as APEC.

The challenges facing Tanzania's LPG sector are related to those highlighted by Ndunguru and Lema, (2020) who found that despite the significant growth of LPG sector in Tanzania, there are several challenges that need to be addressed. One of the challenges is affordability, another is high upfront costs for LPG equipment, particularly for low-income households. Safety concern is another challenge. Insufficient public awareness about LPG safety and improper handling of LPG cylinders poses risks to public safety and is considered to be a bottleneck. Limited distribution network and inadequate distribution infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, restrict LPG access to a significant portion of the population.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study set out to examine the effect of global energy governance and local energy policies in Tanzania on the development of energy security in terms of supply of LPG in the country. The study concludes that global governance has considerable effect on the development of the liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania. International propaganda and politics involving the production and distribution of LPG negatively affects its price and availability. The existing regime of strategies and energy policies and institutions at the global level have not been prioritizing the development of the LPG in developing countries, Tanzania included. They have been selective, politicized and exclusive. The country still imports much of its LPG and has not been able to attract enough investment in the sector.

In addition, local policies governing the LPG sector have been found to be limited in their ability to ensure reliable supply chains for the LPG. Neither have they attracted adequate investment from private international capital towards the LPG sector. Existing

policies have also not been effective enough in promoting the use of LPG among Tanzanians. Likewise, the policies have not effectively discouraged the use of charcoal as a source of domestic energy for cooking. In this way the security of the supply of LPG in the country has not been ensured.

The study recommends that in order to improve the liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania, clear and implementable policies should be given priority, focusing on citizen sensitization and promotion of the benefits of LPG and discouraging the use of charcoal and other unsustainable sources of energy. Moreover, the study recommends that public private partnership should be encouraged as a means to improve the level of liquefied petroleum gas energy security in Tanzania. Private sector inclusion may go as far as cross border bilateral agreements that may help in reducing dependence on expensive sources of LPG. Finally, Tanzania should strength essential elements such as technology, expertise and infrastructures to attract more investors in the LPG sector. This should go hand in hand with having policies that favour investment in energy sector.

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The Relevance of 'Nyumba Kumi' Grassroots Security Structure in Addressing the Rise of Extremist Violence in Tanzania

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Abstract

The re-introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 significantly weakened the functioning of security structures at the grassroots level. The weakening of Nyumba Kumi security structure, which had for a long time been part of the governance structure under single party rule, created a security gap in the provision of effective grassroots security early warning system in Tanzania. This paper examines the subsisting relevance of Nyumba Kumi grassroots security structure in addressing the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania. Data were generated from field work conducted in Tanga region in Tanzania. Using case study design, qualitative approach was employed to conduct key informant interviews (KIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) from a population sample of 59 community members obtained through purposive sampling and snowballing techniques. The views and responses were gathered and analyzed through thematic analysis technique. The findings show that Nyumba kumi still remains a viable and reliable grassroots security structure with effective early warning security system in addressing the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania. The paper recommends the review of security policies to allow re-nationalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures into local government administrative structures.

Keywords:

Community policing, early warning systems, grassroots security structures, Nyumba Kumi, violent extremism.

1. Introduction

The Nyumba Kumi¹ grassroots security system was introduced in Tanzania in 1963. The system was the ruling political party (Tanganyika African Union – TANU)'s strategy which established ten house cells governance structures to consolidate grassroots influence in Tanzania (Igle, 1972). The single party rule of the time plus the delicacy of handling the new government during cold war tensions motivated the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) leadership to implement a nation building project through the establishment of ten house cell structures headed by a ten-house cell leader who acted as the bridge between the ruling party and the grassroots population (Rigby, 1977).

The Nyumba Kumi security structure operated effectively in Tanzania from 1963 to 1991 by providing effective early warning which helped in detecting and tracking crimes

¹ 'Nyumba Kumi' means ten houses in Kiswahili.

before they were committed. The re-introduction of multiparty system in 1992 in Tanzania disrupted the functioning and structure of the Nyumba Kumi security setting which was directly linked to one political party. The Nyumba Kumi (ten house cell) representative served as the grassroots security personnel who reported to the government on potential security threats facing the ten-house cell grassroots population (Levine, 1972).

During multiparty politics, the ten house cell representatives fail to exert influence on community members who are members of opposition parties. This disrupted the Nyumba Kumi early warning system. The ten house cell leaders gathered security related information and reported promptly to the government security apparatus for quick intervention. The disruption of the Nyumba Kumi security structure created enabling environment that favored criminals to plan and commit violent extremist incidents in the grassroots community without being noticed. Despite the implementation of various alternative forms of security programs such as community policing, neighbourhood nightwatch, *ulinzi shirikish*, or *polisi jami*², public education programs, door to door foot patrol, neighborhood watch programs, neighborhood community and town meetings, these arrangements have failed to produce effective early warning for tracking and detecting potential grassroots security threats in the communities (Yegon, 2019).

2. Security Threats and Importance of Grassroot Security Structures

Tanzania's proximity to Kenya, Somalia and Mozambique where Al-shabaab and al-Qaeda terrorist groups have firm roots, makes the spread of extremism violence into Tanzania very likely. A series of violent extremist-related crimes were reported in Tanzania from 2000 to 2019. Several measures were therefore taken to strengthen the security architecture to respond quickly to limit further spread of violent extremist attacks in the country. Some reports indicate that Tanzania has been a recruiting ground for terrorist fighters with astonishing evidence that one of the al-Shabaab affiliated fighters who participated in the 2015 Garissa University assault in Kenya, which claimed more than 150 lives, was a Tanzanian (Dang, 2019).

To address the rising violent extremist security challenge activated by the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Dar es salaam, the prevention of terrorism Act was passed in 2002 which set out the country's plan for counterterrorism, followed by the establishment of National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) which is proactive in countering extremist violence. To prevent the continuation of extremist attacks in the country, decisions were made to reform the Tanzania police force (TPF) in 2006 to allow for the formation of citizen-led community policing security structures (Cross, 2014). This state of affairs requires a thorough scholarly interrogation to establish evidence-based security interventions and recommendations necessary for addressing security threats facing the Tanzania grassroots communities. Therefore, this paper seeks to bridge the gap of knowledge by disclosing the strengths of the Nyumba Kumi security structure versus the weaknesses of the current alternative forms of grassroots community policing security structures.

² *Ulinzi shirikishi* is a concept of involving local community members in providing security services and *polisi jami* is the Swahili word for 'community police'.

The use of government led security initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism have proved failure to guarantee sustainable community peace and security in the East African region (Ruteere, 2017; Barihuta, 2017). This claim is justifiable by looking at several violent extremism incidents that faced the countries despite the presence of government security forces. Scholars suggest an alternative way in addressing security concerns through the use of grassroots-based community policing security initiatives (Ayiera and Eva, 2017; Gogfrey and Dixon, 2017).

Jingu and Walwa (2017), Jingu (2018), and Dang (2019) argue that community-led security structures are the best mechanisms in the detection and tracking of violent extremism security threats in Tanzania. Killian (2018) and Sambaiga (2018) also showcase Nyumba Kumi as an effective early warning and response mechanism for addressing violent extremist crimes in Tanzania. While community policing is locally considered to be a very effective means of preventing crimes and improving neighborhood safety in Tanzania, the extent to which the current practices of community policing structures constitute more refined accountability and responsiveness in detecting and tracking potential security threats is questionable (Cross, 2014).

This paper focuses on the importance of creating an effective mechanism to bridge the gap existing between the government security forces and the grassroots community's security initiatives as reliable solution in addressing crimes committed by violent extremist groups. It is generally assumed that grassroots-led security structures and government security forces are two independent security regimes which don't trust each other and operate without exchanging reliable intelligence information hence contributing to the failure in addressing grassroots community security threats. The government security forces suffer from superiority complex by undermining and ignoring the capacity of community led security structures to ensure peace and security in the country. These tendencies create difficulties for the grassroots community members to report potential security threats to government security forces. This allows extremist agents to penetrate easily by planning and committing crimes in the grassroot communities.

Security issues are central to the people in the communities and collective measures involving each person in the community is essential because the government security officers are very few in number. The concept of community-based policing, as explained above, started to operate in Tanzania in 2006 due to the rise of violent extremist incidents in the country. The community-based security groups were introduced by the Police General Order (PGO) which requires the police force to cooperate with the grassroot communities and other security stakeholders to address security concerns in the country. The overriding reason is to engage grassroot community members to participate in the promotion of peace and security.

3. Theoretical approach

This paper is guided by the nodal governance approach which emphasize the importance of using multiple stakeholders in the provision of grassroots community security. Nodal governance explains how multiple actors create a capable and powerful force to address the rising potential of security threats facing the grassroots communities. The use of multiple security actors such as the state, private sector, civil society and each community

member can yield positive outcomes in detecting and tracking potential security threats before escalating to harmful violent incidences (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). This supports the perspective that the state is not an exclusive actor in the provision of security. It needs the cooperation of non-state actors to ensure peace and security in the grassroot communities (Dupont et al., 2003).

The nodal approach helps to understand how grassroots based security initiatives are very effective nodes for effective provision of grassroots community security. In this paper security structures are collective community ways involving each community member in addressing grassroots security threats. This requires the total involvement of community members in agreed community enforcement mechanisms for tracking and detecting security threats facing the community.

The adoption of Nyumba Kumi grassroots security setting in Tanzania was not only a good example but also a very effective early warning mechanism in addressing security threats during the 1960s to early 1990s. Unfortunately, the Nyumba Kumi security structures changed after 1992. This change compromised grassroots peace and security in the country (Fink et al, 2013). The abandonment of proper Nyumba Kumi security practices, and the application of various forms such as community policing structures resembling Nyumba Kumi failed to function effectively and created safe avenues for criminals and violence perpetrators to utilise the security vacuum to plan and commit violent extremism attacks without being noticed easily by the community members. Its in this context that this study set out to examine the performance of alternative security systems of community policing by collecting evidence from Tanga region.

4. Methodology

Data for this study was obtained from two districts (Tanga urban and Mkinga rural) in Tanga region. Using case study design, analysis of violent extremist attacks committed near Amboni caves in 2016, the paper showcases the weaknesses of the alternative community policing grassroots security initiatives. A combination of purposive and snowballing sampling techniques was used in the selection of research participants. Purposive sampling involved the selection of informants who possessed the needed information on the subject under enquiry. Snowballing sampling method helped in identifying individuals with relevant information who were thereafter requested to recommend some other informants having the same information. The use of snowballing sampling created a sample of 24 key informants for in-depth interviews and a total of 35 informants for five focus group discussions. Key informants and focus group participants were carefully selected to represent the marginalized groups within the community such as women, youth, and the elderly.

Key informants were three government officials at the regional level, eight government officials from Mkinga and Tanga districts, three officials from Chumbageni and Mzizima wards in Tanga district, three officials from Mkinga and Mtimbwani wards in Mkinga district. Five informants from Mleni and Kisosora streets located in Amboni and Mzizima wards from Tanga urban district. Five informants were selected from Mkinga Leo and Mtimbwani villages representing Mtimbwani ward from Mkinga rural district. Focus group discussions included two youth groups from Mleni Street in Tanga urban district and the other from Mkinga Leo village in Mkinga rural district. Two women

groups were selected from Kisosora and Mleni streets in Tanga urban district, and a mixed group from Mtimbwani village in Mkinga rural district. Mkinga district represented a rural district bordering Kenya with much experience of cross-border violence and Tanga urban district represented a cosmopolitan society which has experienced violent extremist attacks. An online survey of documentary materials was done to extract related information on the subject under investigation.

Tanga region was chosen primarily because of its proximity to the border with Kenya and the prevalence of security threats such as human trafficking and drug trafficking across the border. The region also faces a problem of illegal immigrant tribes from Kenya such as the Duruma, Taita, and Kamba residing in Mkinga rural district. Duruma and Taita tribes have lived together with Tanzanian tribes like the Digo, Sambia, Zigua, Segeju, Yao, Makonde, and Bondei leading to the formation of a community with strong ties in Kenya and Tanzania. Tanga as an entry region to Tanzania from Kenya and Somalia shelters a lucrative black-marketing business conducted between Tanzania and Kenya. This involves the transportation of various industrial commodities from Kenya to Tanzania and livestock and agricultural products from Tanzania to Kenya.

5. Findings and Discussion

Field evidences show that community policing engagement security structures practiced currently in Tanga, prove that the Nyumba Kumi security system is no longer operating effectively to guarantee grassroots community peace and security. Nyumba Kumi security system ceased to operate effectively after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 in Tanzania. Yet, it is arguable that the system was not abandoned because its ineffectiveness. Actually, neighboring countries in East Africa, like Kenya and Rwanda with multiparty politics, still use security systems similar to Nyumba Kumi security structures and are reported to have reduced significantly the occurrences of violent incidents in the grassroots communities (Kioko, 2017).

In comparison, Tanzania has more favorable conditions than Kenya and Rwanda to implement Nyumba Kumi security systems in the era of multipartyism. The fact that community members have different political ideologies has not created huge divisions among community members. Despite the challenge of tribalism forces which have divided greatly the community members in neighboring countries of Kenya and Rwanda, this has not been the case in Tanzania. It is also notable that there neighboring countries learnt good lessons from Tanzania and then customized the institutionalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures in their local government administration to serve as early warning mechanism to address the rise of extremist violence (Andhoga and Movole, 2017). In Kenya and Rwanda, the adoption of Nyumba Kumi community policing practices has intensified police patrols in the communities, improved police-citizen relations which helps in information exchange and intelligence gathering (Purdeková, 2016), and improved the cooperation of private security firms in keeping peace and security for the grassroots communities (Yegon, 2019; Munyao, 2017).

It is thought provoking to note that while the neighboring countries are referring to Tanzania as a good case study where Nyumba Kumi security system originated, the Tanzania government is still hesitant and reluctant to re-institutionalize the Nyumba Kumi security structure in its local government administrative structures. This decision

has amounted to the current failure to guarantee grassroots community peace and security in the country. Maguta et al argue that:

The Nyumba Kumi was initiated by the Government of Kenya to address the rising insecurity in Kenya coupled with terrorist attacks by groups like the Al-Shabab. It was initiated in 2013 after the Westgate Mall attack. It aimed at neighbours teaming up and watching on any intruders and people raising suspicion. It is argued that it was borrowed from Tanzania but follows the Western European model of neighbourhood watch (2021, p.155).

Field evidence shows also that the Nyumba Kumi security system has been replaced by the community-based policing structures in Tanga region. In Tanga urban district, the grassroots security structure begins with the five members of the street government who are elected periodically together with the street chairperson during grassroots elections. In this grassroot security setting, community members are required to report potential security threats to the nearby local government authorities which channel the information to higher authorities for further actions. This security setting has not been effective like the way Nyumba Kumi operated in terms of size of the controlled population and the quickness of transforming security signals to higher authorities for action.

In Mkinga rural district, the community policing security structure begins with small hamlet chairperson who receives potential security threats from community members and reports to village chairperson who also reports to village executive officer (VEO) and thereafter to higher authorities for intervention. This security setting falls short of the way Nyumba Kumi operated to guarantee grassroots peace and security. Field evidences indicate that the reporting hierarchy is not always followed by the people when reporting security concerns. In some cases, the people reported directly to any security structure close to them. Despite the presence of ward police officers and the availability of police force contacts provided for this purpose, such arrangements, in reality, have failed to yield the expected results.

This is witnessed by the increasing trend of violent extremist incidents due to structural weaknesses of the present community security structures which have failed to operate as an effective grassroots early warning system. There are notable weaknesses in community engagement in security initiatives in urban and rural settings. For example, the street and hamlet chairpersons have no control of the population residing within the community households which exceed eighty (80) per hamlet and street. The huge number of households does not only cause difficulties for the people to report security threats to grassroots leaders, but also makes the functions of street and hamlet chairpersons irrelevant in responding to potential security threats facing the grassroots community.

The previous practice of Nyumba Kumi security structure before 1992 provided to the ten-house cell leader maximum control of the population residing in ten house cells. The Nyumba Kumi security setting increased trust, commitments and unity among members and the ten house cell leaders exercised successfully their security roles. It is true that the operation of Nyumba Kumi security setting cannot work currently exactly as it operated previously due to many changes in the society, but if institutionalized into local government structures, Nyumba Kumi security structure can effectively guarantee the security of the grassroots communities. The Nyumba Kumi security system operated as

the government's security eye and ear which saw and heard everything at one time in each place regardless of the size of the population (Maguta et al., 2021). Under the Nyumba Kumi proper security setting, all security related information was available and was reported immediately to the ten-house cell leaders who reported the matter to government security structures who responded proactively to prevent the occurrence of violent crimes.

Under Nyumba Kumi security setting, each Tanzanian citizen was not only perceived a security officer but in reality, worked as an intelligence officer because each citizen took security issues seriously with the notion that the security of one was the security of the entire community and the country. Under Nyumba Kumi, every visitor who passed in a certain locality, his or her information was gathered and reported to the ten-cell leader. In this way, it was very rare for someone to plan and commit a crime without being noticed. This is why the country experienced no violent extremist incidents from 1960s to 1980s. This is supported by several scholars reporting that the adoption of Nyumba Kumi security structure in 2013 in Kenya did not only reduce youth community violence but also played a crucial role in community peace-building.

The decision to abandon the proper operation of Nyumba Kumi security setting was followed by a sudden rise of violent extremist related attacks which happened in large numbers in the country, causing insecurity and fear to the community from 2000 to 2019. Global terrorism database reports that for the period from 2008 to 2017, a total of 43 terror attacks were conducted in Tanzania. The number may be higher because the Tanzania government has always reduced terrorism attacks to criminal activities (Dang, 2019). Notable violent extremist attacks which occurred in Tanzania include the 2012 acid attacks on Sheikh Fadhili Suleiman Soraga, the then secretary to the Mufti of Zanzibar; explosive attacks on Sheikh Abdulkareem Njonjo in Arusha in 2012; the December 2012 killing of Fr. Evarist Mushi and the shooting of Father Ambrose Mkenda in Zanzibar; the bombing of Olasiti Catholic parish in Arusha on May 5, 2013; the May 2013 bomb attack that killed three and injured sixty at St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church near Arusha; the events of February 2013 where a Catholic Priest was assassinated and protestant church burned in Zanzibar; the murder of Reverend Mathayo Kachila, the Assemblies of God pastor due to a fight over the right to slaughter animals in Buseresere, Geita in 2013; explosive attack on Sheikh Sudi of Ansar Sunni Mosque in Kilombero in 2014; bombing of a night park pub in Minazini area in 2014; explosive attacks on a mosque in stone town in Zanzibar in 2014 which killed one person; attacks of two Christian churches and restaurants in Zanzibar in June 2014; brutal butchering of one auxiliary guard in Kilindi, Tanga in 2014 (Jingu, 2018).

Many of the extremist violent incidents occurred in Tanga. These include the setting on fire of a student hostel at Montessori Sisters' school under Roman Catholic Church in Lushoto, Tanga in 2015; the Amboni caves brutal killing of eight citizens in Kabatini Street in Tanga on 31st May 2016; the attack on Sebastian Kolowa Memorial University (SEKOMU) in September 2016 in Lushoto, Tanga where one private security guard was killed and two student hostels set on fire.

The occurrence of the above listed violent attacks in Tanzania is closely associated with the ineffectiveness and embedded weaknesses of the current community policing security

structures. There is no total involvement of every community member in security issues, which is a loophole for criminals and armed gang groups to plan and conduct violent attacks. It's undeniable that, the number of government security personnel in the government security forces is smaller compared to the needs. The government security personnel cannot be present in every location at all time, but the grassroots community members are in a better position to observe every happening in the community. The overriding strength of the Nyumba Kumi proper security setting was its smart inclusive strategy which involved each and every member of the grassroots community both in urban and rural settings.

The notable drawbacks of the current grassroots community security setting in the form of community policing are on the following accounts: first, structural weaknesses in reporting mechanism, as it requires the street leaders in urban setting and hamlet leaders in rural setting to oversee a huge population of more than eighty households, something which is not practical. Second, community members dislike to report potential security threats to grassroots community policing leaders, and to government ward police officers because corruption behavior has removed confidentiality. Third, the lack of trust between the government security forces and the grassroots community policing security structures. This seriously hampers effective exchange of intelligence information for security purposes. Dang (2019:16) reflecting the mistrust between the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and other security actors, points out that:

By establishing the polisi jamii as the eyes and ears of the TPF at the ward level, the TPF more frequently interacts with its informants than with ordinary members of the broader community. As a result, the TPF's community policing initiative has failed to pave the way for greater trust building between local communities and the police force.

Fourth, community members lack of concern in security issues, as the philosophy that one's security is security of all is no more believed. Fifth, lack of total involvement for community members in the current grassroots security structures. Presence of disunity and lack of cohesion for community members with different political party ideologies creates unnecessary divisions. This delegitimizes the position of the ten-house cell leader and making it useless in the current security context because the position is not backed up by local government administration structures.

Field evidence from Tanga region reports the existence of very few active and scattered community policing grassroots security groups in Tanga urban district which operate in just four wards of Tanga Sisi, Maweni, Nguvumali, and Chungulieni. Field evidence also reported the existence of ten dormant community policing security groups which operated in case there is an occurrence of violence in the community. It was also discovered that in Mkinga rural district, out of twenty wards, there were no any active community policing security groups which operated to guarantee grassroots community peace and security. Poor relationship between community policing security structures, private stakeholders and the government is another factor contributing the current failure to keep peace and security in the country.

Field evidence revealed that the grassroots-based security structures are more accessible and acceptable by the community members because of having close ties and links with

the people in the community than the government security forces and other private security stakeholders. Well planned community engagement security structures like Nyumba Kumi worked effectively in detecting and tracking down the occurrence of violent attacks in the community. Under Nyumba Kumi, all community members residing in ten house cells were totally engaged regardless of gender and religious orientation. In the current community policing security structures, only a few youths and men are involved thus excluding other community members. Although field evidence reports that some community policing security structures involved both women and men to participate in security process, this does not reflect the total community members involvement. For instance, in Mleni Street in Mkinga rural district there were four women and ten men who worked as local security guards, but in reality, the women participate less in security issues in Tanga region due to religious and gender considerations. In Kisosora street in Tanga urban city, it was agreed that all men would take part in night patrol, and women were required to pay Tshs.1000 to the street chairperson for buying security torches and batteries to facilitate night patrols.

Despite the accessibility and acceptability of the current community policing grassroots security setting, community members complained that, the government did not take seriously the role played by village and street chairpersons in grassroots community security structures as it paid them a very little allowance of Tshs. 20,000 per month. The low payment demoralizes the village and street chairpersons to participate effectively in security activities. This is evidenced by the failure to update the residence register books for all community members within each particular administrative area as required by the government.

The ministry responsible for local government introduced the residence register as one among the mechanisms to track the whereabouts and movements of grassroots population in the belief that it is easier to track violence perpetrators planning to commit crimes in the community. But the village and street chairpersons as responsible grassroots officers showed reluctance due to low incentive. Under the Nyumba Kumi security setting the ten house cells register was very active and effective because all community members were registered. Residence registers captured visitors' information as a household leader was required to report all visitors within his or her household. This helped to track and detect all ill-intentioned visitors planning to commit crimes in the community. The weakness revealed in the current community policing engagement security setting is that there is no such effective tracking of visitors and dwellers in the community which complicates tracing of criminals.

Lack of concern in security issues has gone further to the extent that community members residing in one place don't care of what the next-door neighbor is doing. Surprisingly, even though it happens that community members are suspecting or discovering that their next-door neighbor is involved in suspicious activities causing insecurity, community members are reluctant to report instantly such information to government security organs. Despite the fact that the police issued guidelines for house owners (landlords) in rural and urban setting to take necessary information and documentation on their tenants (which includes sizable passport size photo, identity card photocopy, among others) such directive is not implemented and therefore making things worse as it becomes very difficult. It was reported that, in Mtimbwani ward in Mkinga

district, the residence register books were lastly updated in the year 2014-2015, since that time to the time data for this study were collected, nothing had been done to update the residence registers.

This negligence has made easier for criminals and gang leaders to stay comfortably connected with the community members, who sometimes work as informants to facilitate the planning, committing of crimes and ensuring that the perpetrators escape from the scene without being noticed. The reason behind is the fear of revenge from criminals because of mistrust between the community and the police force which is blamed for exposing confidential information and failing to protect the witnesses. In most cases many of the community policing grassroots security structures have either collapsed or are inactive due to fear of revenge from criminals. These evidences suggest the existence of not only fragmented community policing grassroots security structures but also revealing the presence of poor relationship and coordination between community members, government security organs and private stakeholders when dealing with security issues.

The weaknesses in the current community policing grassroots security early warning practices have influenced the emergence of drivers of insecurity and their manifestations in the community. The poor living conditions have influenced the rise of violent extremism as some villagers in Kibatini Street cooperate with the alleged armed bandits and criminals who resided in the Amboni caves. Community members acted as suppliers of information and basic needs to sustain the lives of armed bandits who sheltered in the caves. It was reported that signs of potential security threats happened as incidences of robbery became normal. These included shops raids, seizing of motorcycles, and livestock's grabbing in the Kibatini street and other nearby communities. Despite such manifestations, the current community policing security structures at Kibatini failed to provide proper early warning signals to counter the criminals. This shows the highest extent of lack of concern in security issues among community members, the matter which would have not happened when Nyumba Kumi security structures worked properly.

Drug and human trafficking were other drivers of insecurity and violent extremism incidents especially in Mkinga rural district. Mkinga district borders Kenya by about 78 kilometres of a long and porous land border leaving aside other kilometers covered by the Indian ocean. This extensive and uncontrolled border contributes to the failure to ensure security across the border. This facilitates human trafficking which involve the Somalis and Ethiopians who normally pass from Kenya to Tanzania using Mkinga district as an entry point. There is a high possibility for these illegal immigrants to traffic illegal weapons from other countries to Tanzania or to use Tanzania as a transit country. In connection to this is drug trafficking business, especially khat or Mirungi in Swahili language which is widely transported from Kenya to Tanzania.

Religious differences between Muslim sects in Mkinga rural and Tanga urban districts are sources of insecurity and drivers of violent extremism. The misunderstanding between the Shia and Suni Muslim believers goes to the extent of not greeting each other despite the fact that they are all Muslims. In one scenario, one mosque was built by a certain Muslim sponsor in Duga village, but great confrontations concerning the

management of the Mosque occurred between the two Muslim sects (Shia and Suni), therefore becoming a threat and source of insecurity in the community.

Lack of confidentiality with police officers is another driver of insecurity. Despite good cooperation provided by community members to Tanzania police force, corruption takes away the expected ethical conduct. It was reported that, once criminals are arrested by the police officers, they get the information from the same police officers about who reported them to be arrested. When criminals are released, they seek revenge against those people who reported them. This tendency demoralizes and discourages maximum cooperation of community members with the police. In order to address this relationship puzzle, Dang, (2019: 19) stresses that:

To strengthen the community-police relationship, the TPF will not only have to expand its community policing approach but also address broader complaints of police corruption, abuse of power, lack of professionalism, and poor service delivery. To mitigate some of the risks of an informant-based system, cooperation between the police and local communities should be as transparent as possible while also protecting the confidentiality of informants.

The failure to keep peace and security in Tanzania at the grassroots setting reveals the weaknesses in the alternative community policing security structures, which despite their presence, the number of violent attacks skyrocketed from 2000 to 2019. The quick rise of violent extremist-related attacks in the country is a clear manifestation of the lack of alternative of community policing after abandoning Nyumba Kumi system.

This study uses the Amboni cave violent extremist attacks to justify how far the current community policing security structures have failed to detect and track potential security threats in Tanzania. The Amboni caves brutal killing happened on 31st May 2016. A total of eight citizens were butchered in Kibatini Street located just 55km from Tanga city. Findings show that perpetrators who engineered the event started living in the Amboni caves since the year 2012 with false pretense of conducting mineral exploration in the area around the Amboni caves.

Initially, the strangers appeared as good people with positive intention to cooperate with the villagers to uncover the precious minerals in the area. The strangers promised the villagers that once minerals are discovered it would be the end of poverty for them. Slowly the strangers mingled with the locals in the area and because of the absence of Nyumba Kumi security mechanism in the area, neither leaders nor villagers bothered to report to government authorities about the presence of these strangers in the area. This reveals the failure of community policing security structure in providing early warning.

As time went on, everyone in the village new about these people, and the fact that they were living in the Amboni caves did not scare the villagers. Communication ties and links were more developed and strengthened where some community members become middle men supplying basic needs such as food, water, drinks and other needs required to sustain the lives of armed criminals. It was reported that one of the victims who by the time was member of the Mleni street government had a small shop in the area. This shop was reported to have expanded enough to supply many commodities in the street and to the strangers living in the Amboni caves. Field evidence associated this person and other few

villagers with the armed criminals who lived in the Amboni Caves. The community members after seeing that their grassroot leader was close to these strangers, they had confidence that the strangers had no bad intentions, and therefore nothing was reported to government security organs.

At the midst of the continued armed robbery events conducted in Mleni and Kibatini streets, the armed bandits organized two successful events in April, 2016 in Tanga urban city. The first event was an invasion at the famous bakery supermarket which involved the killing of four innocent citizens and robbing of a sum of ten million Tanzania shillings from the owners. The second armed robbery event targeted one petrol station in Tanga urban city. These two violent incidents sent an alarm to government security organs in Tanga and after a careful investigation the security organs detected that the armed bandits group lived in Amboni caves.

After the two robbery events in Tanga city, the community members at Kibatini and Mleni streets became conscious that the strangers living in the caves were not good people, the situation which stopped the supply chain of foods and other services for sustaining the life in the caves. It then followed that, the police patrol car in cooperation with Mleni and Kibatini streets security committee members launched unsuccessful ambush in the Amboni caves which failed to arrest the criminals. The failure of this mission was facilitated by the network of informants in the two streets who informed the armed criminals to hide. Then the armed criminals lacked basic needs to sustain their lives in the caves and started looking for ways to get food from the village. In the same week the people in Kibatini area noticed the presence of five children aged eight to twelve years, coming from the Amboni caves to the community to find food. This time the information was reported quickly to government security forces who responded quickly and successfully arrested four children and the fifth one who had a gun ran away successfully back into the caves.

This event was well noticed by networks of informants and close allies of the armed criminals. Therefore, everything was reported to the group of armed criminals telling them exactly who reported their whereabouts to the government security organs. On the night of the third day after those children were arrested by the police force, a group of those armed criminals from Amboni caves visited the Kibatini street and marked the houses of the people whom they were sure had reported them to state security organs and planned to conduct revenge attacks. The villagers reported instantly via mobile phones to the police in Tanga city and to Pande Military base located few kilometers from Kibatini street. Unfortunately, (or deliberately) the police force arrived late at 4:00 pm the next day and failed to arrest the criminals. Explaining the series of violent incidents conducted in Rufiji and Kibiti and about the danger of community members who turn to be informers of armed criminals reflecting the failure of community policing structures at the grassroots, Jingu (2018:9) reported that:

Illuminatingly, according to the police, in one of the incidents where the police were in a mission to ambush one of the camps of a criminal enterprise, they met a group of about five women who claimed to have been looking for firewood. On reaching at the camp, they found it empty without the suspects; it was later realized that the women who met the police along the way were informers of the criminal enterprise.

Surprisingly, the state security organs never took extra attention in making continued patrol to guarantee the people's security in Kibatini street despite the fact that the villagers continually reported to security organs about the pending potential insecurity of being attacked by those armed criminals sheltering in the caves. Field evidence shows that, if the Pande military base could have responded immediately on foot using the shortcut way, they would have arrested the armed criminals and stop the next day brutal killings. This is what this paper considers as weakness of community policing security structures which reveals a high degree of mistrust, poor cooperation, and coordination between the community members and the government security forces not only in exchanging intelligence information but also in cooperating to counter the suspected armed criminals.

The lack of seriousness from the state security organs paved the way to the next day violent extremist brutal killing by beheading a total of eight citizens belonging to earmarked households in Kibatini street. Among the victims of the killing was the Kibatini street chairman. Following this event, all Kibatini street dwellers abandoned their residence and found safe settlement in the nearby places for their safety. In the operation to crack down the group of gangsters in the Amboni caves in a fierce fight, one soldier was killed and four police officers were badly injured (George and Paskal, 2016).

According to law enforcers in Tanga urban district, some of the suspected armed criminals who were arrested after the February 2016 robbery at the Central Bakery Supermarket in Tanga urban revealed the names and identities of their allies who had set up a camp at the Amboni Caves. The four suspects were killed on May 2016 in a gunfight with the police at the Amboni Caves. Those shot dead were two Tanzanians and one foreigner. After the successful operation which killed some of the criminals while others ran away through the porous Mkinga district border to Kenya, the police force in cooperation with the Tanzania People Defense Force soldiers managed to recover various items which were hidden in the Amboni Caves. The items included 195 mobile phone vouchers, seven swords, four machetes, a seesaw, 17 shotgun bullets, militia uniforms, caps resembling those worn by Tanzania Peoples Defense Forces and two motorcycles. They also recovered several cell phones suspected to have been stolen from the Tanga Central Bakery Supermarket.

Then from that time the Amboni caves were declared a special security area which was followed by the establishment of the permanent military base to provide security in the area. Despite the measures taken to address the situation, the community members still have doubts of their security because of the lack of viable and effective grassroots security structures to offer the needed early warning for tracking and detecting potential security threats. After the violent attack in Kibatini and Mleni streets, the participation of community security patrols by the people and local guards stopped to operate unlike the period before Kibatini Killings. The overriding reason was the fear of revenge that was generated from the terror killing of the people in Kibatini street. The people are still feeling insecure despite the establishment of a permanent military base near Amboni Caves. The community was not sure if the Amboni Caves armed gangsters were successfully cleared or still there is a remaining network in the community. This explains why there is decreasing trend of active community led grassroots security action. Dang (2019:1) in a special report on violent extremism and community policing in Tanzania

reports that:

A lack of shared understanding between the community and police as to what constitutes violent extremism, along with a lack of trust in working together on a response, means that police efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism could aggravate rather than mitigate the problem.

This is a clear manifestation of the total failure of the alternative community policing grassroots security structures to guarantee peace and security. This failure is proved by the continued occurrence of other violent extremism terror attacks in Tanzania. These incidents include the systematic killing of village government leaders and ruling political party leaders in Rufiji and Kibiti districts in 2017; killing of two police officers in the invasion of the Ikwiriri police station in 2017; killing of Kibiti Criminal Investigation Officer (CIO) plus two officials from the ministry of resources at the tax collection center in Majawa ward on February 21, 2017; robbery of CRDB and Access Banks in Mbagala and National Microfinance Bank (NMB) in Mkuranga district which lead to the death of one police officer in 2017; killing of eight police officers in an ambush attack in Mkengeni village in Kibiti district on April 13, 2017 (Jingu, 2018).

6. Conclusion and policy implications

The drawbacks on the new security systems replacing the Nyumba Kumi system in Tanzania outweigh the observed merits and successes. This evidence is seen in their inability to provide security early warning in urban and rural settings in Tanga and Mkinga districts. This paper suggests that the government should take deliberate action to re-institutionalize Nyumba Kumi proper security system into local government administration structures to allow its operation in the grassroots communities as it operated before 1992. The government should strengthen the current operating alternative community policing security initiatives by reducing the number of households managed by the cell leaders. The adoption of alternative community policing grassroots structures has failed to guarantee grassroots community peace and security, the matter which contributed to mushrooming of many violent extremist incidents from 2000 to 2019 in Tanzania.

The Tanzania government should, in addition, device better ways on how Nyumba Kumi security structure can successfully be implemented in the current era of multiparty politics without comprising its effectiveness in tracking and detecting security threats facing the grassroots communities. Nyumba Kumi security structure still remains the best, reliable and viable grassroots community security structure to address the rise of extremist violence in Tanzania if customized to fit in different security contexts across the country. Before re-institutionalization of Nyumba Kumi security structures, there should be a national campaign to provide awareness to the grassroots communities on the importance of keeping peace and security through Nyumba Kumi grassroots security structures.

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Police – Civilians Relationship and Crime Rate Reduction in Tanga Urban

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Abstract

This article examines the nature of the relationship between the police and civilians in Tanga urban and relates this relationship to the reduction of crimes in the area. The objective of this study was to examine the extent to which the current relationship is regarded by security stakeholders to be positive/good and contributing to crime reduction. This study combines two theories namely; the non-enforcement theory and the theory of change to explain the nature of the relationship. Data was primarily collected from police officers and civilians in Tanga. The findings of the study suggest that, the present relationship does not have enough contribution towards crime rate reduction since the relationship that exists between the two is mostly suspicious. The study concludes and recommends a far stronger cooperation through collective efforts, education, sharing of intelligence information and the designing of new mechanisms that would bring together both the police and civilians in fighting against crimes.

Key Words:

Community policing, corruption, crime rate reduction, police – civilian relations, security

1.0 Introduction

The relationship that exists between the police and civilians under neighbourhood policing, is a strategy and philosophy based on the notion that community - police interaction and mutual support can help control crime and reduce fear of insecurity among community members, (Mwaniki, 2010). The community can help the police for example by helping to identify suspects, helping in arresting law breakers, report security problems to the police or otherwise target the social problems which give rise to a crime in the first place. The relationship among the two parties needs to be positive for these benefits to be realized, (Brogden & Nijhar, 2013).

The police-civilian relationship which is mostly found under community policing has attracted an increasing attention in the last three decades as a strategy to improve public security and safety, (Mwaniki, 2010). The relationship that exists between the police and civilians is an aspect which needs a critical look and understanding because of its potential to contribute to crime reduction. The most common term to describe this relationship is 'Police – Community relations.' In Africa and Tanzania in particular there is a need for studying this relationship since crime is increasing and in some cases there is a Cat and Mouse relationship observable between the police and civilians, (Djurdjevic-lukic, 2014).

According to (Fielding, 2009), police – community relations is “the interactions of police and all community members to reduce crimes and fear that might happen within their surroundings”. Generally, it is a relationship that encourages the public to give a helping hand to their police in searching for security and peace. It challenges the notion that, the fight against crimes and maintenance of order is the duty of the police force alone; and it extends such a task to citizens who are primarily the main agents for peace. For this reason, the relationship between the police and the citizens must aim at generating cooperation, freedom and a willingness from each side to see the other as a partner sharing the common goal of building one society which will be crime free, (Chinwokwu, 2017).

2.0 The Global Context

Worldwide, the emphasis on a good relationship between the police and the people they protect demands that policies guiding community policing should be established to ensure that crimes are reduced and order maintained, (Andrew & Issa, 2025). In high population countries like the United States of America, (with over 300 million people and high rates of crime) need is always seen of public awareness in the communities on how to help the police reduce crime. Assessments on how communities interact with the local police have been conducted so far to assess whether positive relationship has been maintained, (Davis, 2012). The same thing is happening in Europe and particularly in the United Kingdom where it is commonly referred to as neighbourhood watch. This practice of neighbourhood watch started in 1983 following the need to involve the community in what was previously seen as police work, (Fielding, 2009). Under neighbourhood watch the emphasis is put on how the police can help local residents conduct patrol and other security activities within their areas. In this arrangement, people form small groups which patrol their residences and help the police, (*ibid*).

Another example of community policing can be found in Australia. The Australian government issued a report on how community policing functions and compared it to the Asian perspective where the police interact with civilians in their daily patrol to fight crime. This proves that police civilian relations policies have been working throughout the world and facilitate civilian networks in interacting with the police, (Centre, 2014). In Australia, the police forces have been cooperating with the community to uncover cases which might have proved difficult for the police force alone. The same happened in Tokyo, Japan as (Rake, 1987) discovered. When the Japanese police decided to involve civilians in the fight against crime in the City of Tokyo, the crime rate decreased by a half over a period of three decades. The study by Rake has demonstrated the contribution of citizens in the whole process of ensuring that people are living in harmony and tranquillity, (Leishman, 2007).

3.0 The African Context

Insecurity in Africa has been growing and Africa is viewed as a continent with all kinds of conflicts and war, (Spearin, 2014). In Darfur, Sudan, people are also helping the police force together with other security companies to uncover attacks which are arranged by criminal groups. With such attitude, civilians are showing that they prefer peace to violence and a positive relation to a negative one. Studies conducted in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia have shown that the relationship between the police and civilians needs to be reviewed critically across the African continent, (Mwaniki, 2010),

(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009) and (Wong, 2009). Their studies which were conducted through research, questionnaire and observation have mentioned improper police actions, corruption, poor awareness of the laws and leakages of intelligence information as factors influencing the relationship. For instance (Kaburu, 2020) observed that in Kenya, his own country, the relationship between the police and civilians is in danger since there is a perception among many Kenyans that their police force is corrupt and cooperates with criminals and causes street insecurity. With such perception people will never feel safe to share information on criminals believing that criminals are backed up by the police force, (*ibid*).

In the 1980s, Tanzania implemented the strategy which was then known as Sungusungu which could be equated with neighbourhood watch. This strategy involved the establishment of voluntary groups for local security provision, (Andrew & Issa, 2025). The relationship between the police and civilians can be seen clearly under the community policing policy which was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006 under the then Inspector General of Police, Said Mwema. IGP Mwema saw the need for strengthening the relationship between the police and the people they protect as a means of reducing crime in the country, (Cross Charlotte, 2013). Since that time the policy has been implemented across Tanzania starting from Dar es Salaam and moving to other regions. In Tanga region the policy has been practised since 2006. Natives have been participating with the police in the implementation of community policing which, among many objectives, builds the cooperation between civilians and their police force.

4.0 Theoretical Perspectives

Theoretical foundations of the policy are also well established in literature. Under this, (Rake, 1987) emerged with two theories, one of non-enforcement and the other of interaction. The two are focusing on the same idea that the police force should no longer be the agent for enforcing law but that they should intensify their interactions with the people they protect. He cited the City of Tokyo as a place where such theories have managed to strengthen the relationship between the community and police, and also to halve the crime rate after a few years.

Basically, what Rake proposed was that the police force should drop their superiority complex in relation to the people they protect to enable community members to feel a sense of responsibility in collaborating with their police in the fight against crime. These theories suggest more ways in which people can cooperate with the police, who are now interacting with them in their lives and are no longer forcing them to obey, but are coming with different mechanisms to persuade people to comply with the law without the feeling of compulsion.

Again, (Djurdjevic-lukic, 2014) explained the foundation of the theory of change which focuses on the interaction between the police and communities and considers community policing as a potentially important tool through which to improve police-community relations, to develop a model of interaction between the state and traditional leaders, to strengthen accountability of the police to the citizens, and generally to improve the safety and security environment. Her theory proposes that the establishment of state-community security models at the grassroots level is an important aspect in ensuring that citizens are included in security process and cooperate with the police force. It calls

upon all stake holders of security and acknowledges the role of families and minority groups in participating in the issue of security giving them a sense of responsibility for their own security.

5.0 Methodology

This study employed a case study design since Tanga has experienced some security threats in the recent years as mentioned by the police report of 2022. Tanga is a region bordering Kenya hence some crimes that affect Kenya, if not well managed, can spread into the neighbouring Tanzania and mostly through Tanga. It is primarily a qualitative study which included the collection of data through interviews and questionnaires from the sample selected which included police and civilians in Tanga urban. Content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data derived from the open-ended interview questions or information in the form of statements in the open-ended questions of the questionnaires. Quantitative analysis was used to analyse structured questions through the use of Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) where simple descriptive statistics involving analysis of frequencies was performed to analyse the responses from the respondents.

6.0 Study Findings and Discussion

6.1 Nature of relationship and crime rate reduction

The study was interested in examining the nature of the relationship that exists between the police and civilians in crimes rate reduction. The aim of the study was to identify whether the relationship that exists between the police and civilians is positive or negative. Respondents were asked to grade the relationship as to whether it was very good, average, poor or very poor. In their responses the majority of police officers (53%) said that the relationship is poor, whereas 27% of police responded that the relationship is very poor. Only 4 policemen, (13%) said it was average and the rest (7%) commented that their relationship with the civilians is very good and that they help one another in reducing crime within the city of Tanga. Out of the 30 civilian respondents, majority (63%) said that the relationship is poor, while 5 of them (17%) said that it is very poor and 5 (representing 17%) said the relationship is moderate. Only a single civilian commented that the relationship was very good, (3% of the total). The general results from both the police and civilians reveal that the majority of respondents have identified with the negative relationship that exists between the police and civilians within Tanga urban.

In regard to the issue of identifying the relationship that exist between the police and civilians, this study came out with three types of relationships; the positive relationship, the negative relationship and the fifty-fifty relationship. 65% of the respondents who constituted the majority of the respondents said that the relationship that exists in Tanga Urban between the police and civilians is negative. This group was made up of junior police officers who claimed the existence of a gap between them and their commanders. The majority of civilians also commented on the negativity of existing relationship. Respondents mentioned a number of contributory factors.

Corruption and unequal treatment were cited by almost all contributors to the research. As argued by (Parker, 1956) and (Gaffigan, 2018) and repeated by (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009) and (Becker et al, 1974) corruption seems to be the source of the poor

relationship and has contributed to issues of mistrust and the oppression of minority groups. The police officers are seen as a corrupt force which favours the upper classes and obstructs the lower classes that make up the majority of inhabitants of Tanga urban. The motorbike taxi (Bodaboda) operators who were the majority among civilian respondents, lamented that their relationship with the police is deteriorating every day, for the police have in their minds that this group is always associated with criminals or is a part of the criminal fraternity. Since the police officers are at the same time the vehicle inspectors, it is hard for the Bodaboda operators to cooperate with the police for fear of being caught for traffic offences, or of being accused of breach of road regulations. There is a general perception among civilians about the police officers which may hinder the relationship between the two. As explained above, civilians claim the police make excessive use of their power while the police claim that civilians are cooperating with criminals to ambush police posts, wound or kill police officers and steal arms, (Andrew & Issa, 2025; Kaburu, 2020). All of this contributes to the negative relationship which does not help in reducing crimes in Tanga, but rather escalate the issues of insecurity and deteriorating the relationship.

About 25% of respondents who were interviewed identified a positive relationship between the police officers and the civilians they protect in Tanga urban. Most of these respondents were senior police officers and religious leaders. Drawing on some issues where the police and civilians cooperate, the respondents identified a positive relation which least contributes to crime rate reduction. One respondent, for example, alleged that, one police officer responsible for criminal investigation was aware of a number of occasions when information shared by civilians with the police later resulted in the arrest of the law breakers. This respondent went further by pointing out that information from civilians had resulted in the arrest of terrorist suspects. He therefore denied that there is a negative relationship. The police force in Tanga has launched the Regional Police Commander (RPC Cup) which brings together the police in their units and civilians in their local team to compete in football matches in which the winner is presented with the cup by the Regional Police Commander. This competition is played annually and the aim of the founder, who was the then Regional Police Commander, Deputy Commissioner of Police Kashai, was to reduce fear of the people vis à vis the police and to find ways in which the two could interact in a social activity before they interact in important official issues.


The police force in Tanga agreed to have their representatives in all wards of Tanga urban as a response to the policy named “polisi kata”, which demands the participation of police officers at the grass root level. The police assigned there are responsible for dealing with community activities including funerals and other events. The aim is to create closer relations with civilians so that they can view their police force as an agent for peace and as fellow citizens. The other role of the officers in wards is to train all security groups who are locally tasked to perform a ‘neighbourhood watch’. During the defence and security meetings conducted at ward level, the police officer is attending secretary of the meeting, but also responds to all matters related to the people’s safety within the particular ward.

The remaining 5% of the respondents gave a fifty-fifty answer on the existing relationship. The study found that not all the respondents had either a negative or a

positive attitude towards the existing relationship. There was this smaller group who did not accept that everything was either positive or negative. Their ideas were that there are some cases in which the police have messed things up and some where the fault lay with the civilians. One respondent who was asked to describe the existing relationship replied as follows:

'The relationship between the police and civilians here in Tanga is undefined; it depends on the mood of the police officer to help you. If his mood that day is clear then you are lucky, you will see the best of him and if his mood is down...my friend you are finished'. (An interview with a shopkeeper at Jengo Jipya, Chumbageni, Tanga, 18th September 2023).

The figure below presents the respondents stance on the relationship between the police and civilians in Tanga urban in relation to crime rate reduction.



Source: Field Data, 2023

On the extent to which the relationship contributes to crime rate reduction, a large majority of the respondents (70%) from both interviews and questionnaires said that the present relationship between the police force and civilians had no positive impact on crime rate reduction in Tanga Urban. The question on how the policy of community policing could strengthen the relationship and help reduce crime could not be taken further because a number of issues emerged which indicated that not all members of the community had an idea of what is meant by “community policing”, or what is the real aim of community policing towards strengthening the relationship. One police officer interviewed on how community policing can pull together the police and civilians responded as follows:

'This is the new policy which I don't find suitable. For many of us the policy found us out of CCP so if they want it to function the way they want it is better that they start teaching it to the new recruits at CCP...' (Interview with R. A. Police Staff Sergeant, Polisi Jamii (Community Police) Department, Tanga. 18th July, 2023).

In Tanga urban, the police are still seen by the majority of civilians as not cooperating with people, hence the people are not ready to share with them any information which may contribute to crime rate reduction. The issue of linkage of intelligence information which the people who share it with the police force has become a matter of great concern and destroys the relationship. Police are seen to have relations with criminals and so they lose the trust of the other law-abiding citizens. As explained before (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009) found out that there is a strong perception among Kenyans that Police are collaborating with criminals. They pointed out the reasons for this being little pay and underfunding of their activities. The victimization survey in Nairobi found that, 66% of respondents had been victims of crime, while 86% had witnessed crimes in the city and had observed a poor police response to such incidents. In Tanga urban, the research findings show that 83% of the respondents claim that the relationship between the police and civilians will improve only when there is a deal to be made from which both will benefit. The relationship which was intended by the community policing policy to bring together the police and civilians in the fighting against crimes has not been achieved and crimes are escalating day and night.

One civilian, who was a shopkeeper, narrated an incident that he one day reported to the police station. There was a gang around his area dealing in drugs. He considered himself to be a positive informer of the police with the aim of putting such activity to an end, but things turned out against him. One day a police officer approached his shop and secretly planted a bullet in a sack of beans and arrested him for dealing with law breakers by selling bullets. ¹He was detained for some time and later released after the police failed to find evidence. The action not only proved that the police were hiding the criminals but also showed how the law enforcing agents can negatively reward an informer whose aim was to cooperate with them in reducing crimes within the society.

However, a senior police officer Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) ²refused the claim that the police are revealing the names of informers to criminals, though he accepted that some police officers are cooperating with criminals for reasons which he typically called “classified”. This officer tried to elaborate on the types of informers whom his office was dealing with. The first group of informers were the revenge informers who cooperate with police force after their business partners had decided to cooperate with them. For the police these are the positive informers and their aim is to see that both lose. The second are the double dealer informers. This group has relationships with both the police and the criminals. The aim of such informers is to benefit from both sides. For the police force there is a fifty-fifty chance that such are sharing valid information with them. The ASP continued by saying that the third category of informers is the cash informers whose aim is to generate money from the information they share but not to reduce crime. Such groups can sometimes bring false information to the police which will mislead the entire team and portray a negative image of the police to the public. The last informers are the boost informers. These informers are boosting up issues in such a way that a minor case will be seen as huge as a threat to the security of the society. They are also

¹ An interview with a shopkeeper at Jengo Jipya, Chumbageni, Tanga, 18th September 2023

² Assistant Superintendent of Police interviewed on 17th September 2023 at Chumbageni Central Police, Tanga.

the spoilers of the truth and always act in such a way that they appear to be helping the security agents by revealing criminal information while not actually doing so.

The study also discovered that the type of relationship advocated by the community policing policy is only favoured / supported by high-ranking officers rather than the junior police officers who are directly intended to interact with the people. Out of 20 police officers interviewed, 16 (80%) agreed that the junior police officers are not happy with the policy as it gives too much power to the citizens rather than to them. They are the ones in front line dealing with the people, but find that civilians are not respecting them as much as they did before. There is no longer the necessary fear factor in the relationship. Issues of people's awareness of law, formation of security groups among community members and the people's access to the phone numbers of senior police officers have threatened the relationship between the police and civilians. The senior officers agreed that the closeness of the police to the people and awareness of the law among the people will strongly contribute to crime rate reduction. Civilians will now know their rights and will not fear police officers if they share information and refuse to hide criminals.

7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

This study examined the relationship that exists between the police and civilians and identified three kinds of relationships. The first kind of relationship is the negative one, in which the police and civilians have no common ground for working together or assisting one another in fighting crime. The second relationship identified by the study was the fifty-fifty relationship which is rarely found. Finally, there is the positive relationship in which the police and civilians work together as a team to fight against crimes. Secondly, on examining the extent to which the relationship contributes to crime rate reduction the study found that about 70% of the respondents to the questionnaires said that the current relationship between the police and civilians in Tanga urban does not facilitate the reduction of crimes. This suggests that the policy of community policing which insists on strengthening the relationship and the creation of a collective work environment between the police and civilians has not been well implemented; and it seems likely that crime rates will continue to rise.

Lastly, in identifying the ways in which police and civilians can cooperate in reducing crimes within the society the study observed that, a majority of those questioned wanted the people to cooperate with police officers in fighting against criminality in the communities. They also recommended more education to both the police officers and the public on the merits of community policing and the whole process of working together as a team in crime rate reduction.

7.2 Recommendations

Firstly, the police should not be just an enforcement agent as it is now but should be more interactive as (Rake, 1987) suggested in the case of Tokyo's experience. The police force in Tanga should also adopt this behaviour and change their strategies; for example, by avoiding the use of unnecessary force, by stopping harassing the people, and by stopping bearing false witness against the people whom they think are not collaborating. This will bring trust, respect and a sense of ownership of the force by the people of the

community. More intensive interaction is needed such as peoples' participation in the committee of the police force making decisions on matters related to people's security to make sure that each side is well served.

Secondly, the establishing of a state-community security relationship at grass roots level should have a much higher priority than it appears to have at the moment. The police force in Tanga, through the application of Polisi Kata programme, should now see how the new mechanisms will equip the police officers to cooperate and participate fully in matters related to their respective wards to which they have been sent. Hardship allowances will be of great help to officers sent to rural wards to avoid the issue of officers spending most of their time in Tanga town rather than in their working areas. This idea was introduced by (Djurdjevic-lukic, 2014) who insisted on ensuring that citizens are included in security and cooperate with the police force. He called upon all stake holders to security, including families and minority groups to participating in the issues of security thus giving them a sense of responsibility for their own security.

Thirdly, civilians have to change their attitudes towards police officers by starting to help them fight against crimes and criminals. Given that defence and security are the concern of everyone, it is therefore the duty of every person, by the virtue of the authority vested upon them by the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania as citizens, to defend the nation against all enemies being from within or from without the boundaries of the country. People should not leave everything to the police for crimes which start from small beginnings might eventually affect the whole community. Giving a positive hand to the police will strengthen the relationship and will surely reduce crimes and make Tanga Urban a better place for all.

Fourthly, police officers should review their behaviour and actions towards the people they are supposed to protect. Information provided by civilian informers which results in the arrest of criminals should be handled with care. Police should acknowledge the role played by the people in helping them in their daily activities. This acknowledgement includes rewarding the informers to motivate them; but also keeping them safe to avoid them being linked to intelligence information they provided. The traffic officers who were criticised by most of the Bodaboda operators should also change their behaviour by taking this group as an important partner in the fight against crime. This would be useful since these men are hired by many people in different walks of life, some of whom might well be criminals. Using them positively by respecting their ideas and avoiding humiliating them will help to strengthen the relationship and the fight against crimes will prevail.

Lastly, the authority concerned should find as many ways as possible of drawing together police officers and civilians to discuss matters of security. The authorities should establish street patrols to ask the people about the general behaviour of their police officers, since there are some police whom people claim humiliate them. It then becomes a generalisation that the police force in Tanga is humiliating the public. This constant feedback from the civilians will improve the relationship between the police and the civilians and eventually contribute to reducing the rate of crimes.

8.0 References

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EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination: Why has the Implementation Fallen Short of Expectations?

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Abstract

The study assesses the performance of the EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination by identifying challenges in implementing the agreed direction and strategy for the attaining a common regional foreign policy. This assessment was motivated by the progress and effort made by the East African Community (EAC) in implementing and operationalizing the policy coordination protocol. Although the implementation is still ongoing and progress is noted with mixed results, this article addresses the following questions: Why has the implementation of the policy fallen short of expectations? What challenges are faced by the EAC in the implementation of the protocol? Rational choice and constructivist theories were used to evaluate EAC foreign policy practices with partner states. Qualitative thematic analysis of various literature revealed that progress is being made in implementing the policy, but at a slow pace due to frequent disagreements among partner states in areas such as security and trade, thus delaying the establishment of common foreign policy as provided in the EAC Treaty. The paper suggests that member states must set aside their individual interests to achieve effective EAC foreign policy coordination under the said protocol through actionable political will.

Keywords:

Coordination protocol, East African Community, Foreign Policy, National interest, Political will

1. Introduction

Since the inauguration of the new East Africa Community (EAC) on December 1st, 1999, in Arusha, Tanzania, the organisation has gradually assembled a normative framework, instruments, and an action-oriented Common Foreign Policy for creating a conducive atmosphere for regional cooperation. The policy would set a functional structure for effective implementation of decisions taken by the Member States in entire areas of foreign policy coordination and a functional system including structure for an effective realisation of such common regional interests as respect for democratic principles, good governance, peace and security, respect for human rights, and international agreements, which could also accelerate achievement of continental common interests as defined in the African Union (AU) Charter and a long-term vision such as 'Africa we want 2063'.

Such thinking was guided by Article 123 of the EAC Treaty, which calls on partner states to establish as well as implement common foreign and security policies. In the effort to achieve the noble goal of the stated article and taking into consideration that no country can survive on its own, on January 22, 1999, the EAC Partner States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Foreign Policy Coordination. The MoU was later upgraded into an EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination (also sometimes

known as Policy Protocol or Policy), effective December 3rd, 2010. Among the activities envisaged for action under the Protocol for the Partner States were diplomatic missions to effectively coordinate their diplomatic and consular matters; collaboration in multilateral diplomacy; economic and social activities; and capacity building (EAC, 2010).¹

The process is still ongoing and looks strong on paper (Reith & Boltz, 2011), nevertheless, and regrettably, since the establishment of the protocol, more than a decade has passed with mixed results. The process is slow, (though progressive) and as of now, remains an unfinished work. This is evident as partner states have been known to frequently disagree and/or compete in many areas, such as trade and national security matters (The East African, 2018). This scenario indicates a lack of common regional values and futuristic principles to guide the design of a common foreign policy to take the countries closer to the dream of a United Africa. Such gap attracted the author of this article to examine the state of the EAC Foreign Policy Coordination and determine challenges in its implementation.

In order to gather more information on the subject matter, this study utilized a qualitative research approach, including literature reviews, interviews, and consultations with EAC and government officials. It aimed to address cross-cutting issues related to EAC's foreign policy implementation in partner states. The study employed qualitative content analysis and a hermeneutic approach to interpret officials' documents and interview data. The goal was to identify key themes and priorities influencing EAC's foreign policy decisions and create a cohesive framework for collaborative efforts among member states to address regional challenges. The article first introduces the reader to the concept of foreign policy, before embarking on a theoretical consideration. Then the paper provides a short background to the protocol. The next part after the background suggests some identifiable limiting factors to the progress of the protocol. At the end, a general conclusion is provided based on the limiting factors identified. The conclusion incorporates some policy and action recommendations.

2. Conceptualizing Foreign Policy

The current foreign policy practices of the states of the world are as old as the states themselves. Their origins are generally traceable to the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, which created the framework for modern international relations by establishing concepts of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Akopari, 2001; Bojang, 2018). Thus, concepts of state sovereignty, mediation between nations, and diplomacy all find their origins in the text of this treaty. It marks the beginning of governments and statesmen orchestrating relations between their states and others (Patton, 2019). Bojang (2018) added that the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and the process of decolonization that has liberated many states into sovereign entities have further provided the impetus for interrelationships among states. Such moves resulted in the formation of 'foreign policies' with the aim of determining and identifying decisions, strategies, and ends of the interaction of a state with another.

¹ EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination 2010, Art.2.

Furthermore, globalization has increased these interrelationships or interactions among states. Hence, there is unanimity among scholars on the necessity of a foreign policy for each state, since no state could function in complete isolation. Feliks (1954) argued that a state without a foreign policy could be compared to a ship in the deep sea without any knowledge of directions. Thus, foreign policy helps a state to fulfil its national interests and acquire a rightful place among the community of nations.

The term itself (i.e., foreign policy) has been defined in various ways by scholars and involves a variety of theories attempting to understand as well as interpret how the policy is made, who made it, who implements it, and how and what outcomes are achieved. However, despite its necessity, foreign policy analysis is a contested study, especially in terms of definition (Mushtaq & Choudhry, 2013). Gwatiwa (2020) defines foreign policy as the manner in which decision-makers such as heads of state and government, ministers, and international diplomats conduct diplomacy in an international milieu. Hostli (1982) contends that foreign policy is a behavioural pattern of the state adopted to respond to the international environment in which the state exists. Therefore, we are certain that it is concerned with the behaviour of a state in relation to external actors (Bojang, 2018; Bischoff, 2020).

Besides, foreign policy is composed of goals sought, values set, norms, decisions made, and actions taken by states and national governments acting on behalf in the context of the external relations of national societies (Jensen, 1982). It is a tool used to pursue, promote, and protect national interests, as well as project national norms and values. According to Modelski (1962), it is defined as the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment. Foreign policy must throw light on the ways states attempt to change and succeed in changing the behaviour of other states. Modelski noted only aspects of policy that aim at change in the existing behaviour of states as primary objectives of foreign policy.

However, foreign policy is not only to change but also to continue the behaviour at different times. It is concerned both with change and the status quo as long as they serve the national interest. In the same vein, the EAC's founding three member states-Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda-decided to re-establish the community in 2000 after its collapse in 1977. It is the foreign policy of the three mentioned states towards the continuation of relationships with an old ally within a community after realising the potentiality of the entity. According to Frankel (1968), foreign policy consists of decisions and actions that involve, to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others. Foreign policy involves a set of actions that are taken within a state's borders, intended to target forces existing outside the country's borders. According to Frankel, it comprises the formulation and implementation of a set of ideas that govern the behaviour of states while interacting with other states to defend and enhance their national interests.

The question of what defines national interest, however, has been up for debate for a while. The phrase "national interest" can be broadly defined as the goals of a state in its interactions with the outside world. National interests are very dynamic. However, they are fundamentally composed of three things: economic development, state ideology

protection, and national security. Although these are the longest-lasting aspects of foreign policy, it is possible for other transient goals and interests to emerge. Hence, there are three levels to foreign policy. They encompass fundamental interests and ideals such as unity, defence, self-preservation, and the preservation of values. The middle-range goals, which include trade, international aid, and military prowess, are included in the second level. Universal long-range goals, such as plans, aspirations, and designs about the final political or ideological structure of the international system, make up the third category of national interests.

Additionally, Mushtaq and Choudhry (2013) contend that a number of factors influence the foreign policy process. They fall into two categories: internal and external forces. Since foreign policy is a continuation of national policy, internal variables working within the state have a critical role, particularly when it comes to international policy development. Three tiers of domestic issues that influence the formulation of foreign policy are identifiable. The head of state and other members of the foreign policy elite are among the actual policymakers who make up the first level. Interest groups that impact foreign policy procedures make up the second level. Domestic variables, such as customs, values, and norms, make up the third level. As a result, the process of formulating foreign policy revolves around a number of domestic elements, including interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the head of state, and the media. However, the type of government determines how many domestic variables are involved. For example, in a military dictatorship compared to a democracy, non-state players have less influence on foreign policy. Foreign policy elites are influenced by bureaucracy in the government, public opinion, and the psychology and mental health of their leaders while making choices. The development and application of foreign policy are also influenced by outside variables. This is so because the framework for implementing the policy is created by the global system.

Furthermore, Mushtaq and Choudhry (*ibid.*) note that a number of universally relevant criteria influence how a state behaves in its foreign policy. They comprise topographical elements, including topography, mineral riches, and position. Another factor is a state's past, including its interactions with the outside world. Global warming, international law, and other contemporary concerns are examples of international issues, pressures, and limits that affect a state's foreign policy decisions. Both the quality of the leader in charge and quantifiable behaviours like population size and quality are important. Any state's foreign policy is also determined by its economic and military prowess.

3. Theoretical Stance

Nevertheless, in evaluating the EAC foreign policy practices this article utilises two theories: rational choices, which tend to favour a state-to-regional level approach, and constructivist theories, which favour a regional-state level approach. Constructivism in this context is a systemic approach to understanding state interests and state behaviour by investigating a regional character with a focus on issues of social values that affect identities and even interests. The principal concerns of constructivism theory are three aspects: Firstly, states are the core units of analysis. Secondly, structures of states are intersubjective, and, relatedly, state identities and interests are similarly socially constructed.

Constructivism is similar to rational choice theory in that it applies to a variety of areas, including economics, psychology, and philosophy. This theory states that individuals use their self-interests to make choices that will provide them with the greatest benefit. People weigh their options and make the choice they think will serve them best. Rational choice theory can be helpful in understanding individual and collective behaviours. It helps to pinpoint why people, groups, and society as a whole move towards certain choices based on specific costs as well as rewards. Therefore, this study combines constructivism theory in understanding EAC foreign policy coordination and practices towards its member states, together with rational choice theory.

4. Background of the EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination

The current community's protocol on foreign policy dates back to the interaction of three East African states throughout pre-colonial times (Mangachi, 2011), especially after Britain's acceptance of the League of Nations mandate over the former three East African counties (Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda). The first move towards cooperation between the countries was made in 1919. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika (current mainland Tanzania), all of them under the British East Africa Administration, formed a customs union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, with Tanganyika joining the two in 1927 (Hazlewood, 1979; Adar & Ngunyi, 1994; EAC, 2010; Bar, 2018).

Economic and political links were strengthened in 1948 after the establishment of the East African High Commission (EAHC) as a coordinating and supervisory body for the execution of common initiatives within the region: economic (among others, the postal and customs union, developing uniform tariffs for external services), scientific and educational undertakings (for example, the East African University), transportation and communication (railways, harbours, airports, the telegraph), as well as a common department of meteorology. The East African Common Services Organisation (EASCO) was founded in 1961 to replace the colonial-era EAHC after its structure became outdated following the colonial system's collapse (Johns, 1963).

In its existence, EASCO adopted a number of solutions and plans from its predecessor but executed them within the new, changed political conditions (Mangachi, 2011). Therefore, upon achieving independence, new nations generally regarded some form of continued association with the former metropolitan power as useful and necessary. At the same time, they strongly believed that the continuation of their ties with their former colonial masters should be accompanied by the forging of new links with other states in order to tackle the major problems of economic development and technical assistance. Thus, the leaders of the newly independent states, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, Milton Obote of Uganda, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, urged for continued cooperation in joint integration ventures undertaken within the new political reality on the countries' own initiatives and under independent leadership.² This was the first time that the three EAC countries, which together made up the EAC bloc, collaborated on foreign policy. This confirms constructivism theory which grounded on the assumption that every state's policy system is demonstrable in its socio-cultural and historical realities which, to some

² The region's countries gained their independence in the early 1960s (Tanzania in 1961, Uganda in 1962, and Kenya in 1963).

degree, explains the state's foreign policy efforts and behaviours instead of the out-and-out material interests (Burchill et al., 2005).

Nevertheless, transformation from the EAHC to the EASCO did not change the structural pattern of the economic system put in place by the British during the colonial period, where most of the major foreign industrial companies and colonial interests were located in Kenya, for example, British American Tobacco, Shell, East Africa Bata Shoes, and ESSO, to mention a few (Johns, 1963; Green, 1967; Mangachi, 2011). To address this problem, the three countries met in Kampala in 1964 to discuss the inter-territorial imbalance in trade and industry. In the meeting, they agreed to provide for the introduction of quotas by countries sustaining deficits in interterritorial trade, to limit trade imbalances, and to allocate new major industries in favour of Tanzania and Uganda on the basis of a licencing system. The agreement, usually referred to as the Kampala Agreement (Green, 1967; Mangachi, 2011), was not actually ratified and was never implemented because it was not fully satisfactory to any of the partner states (Mangachi, 2011; Arowolo, 1970). For example, Tanzania considered it ineffective because it failed as it did in its prime task of redressing East African trade imbalances. Failure to implement the Kampala Agreement led to the introduction of quantitative restrictions on inter-territorial trade.

The three member states were dissatisfied with the drift towards disintegration because of their failure to implement the Kampala agreement. Therefore, in late 1965, Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta, and Obote agreed to set up the Commission on East Africa Cooperation to review existing arrangements and propose means of increasing their viability and net benefits as well as equalising the distribution of regional gains among the partner states aimed at preserving common services under EASCO. The Joint Commission, under an independent chairperson, was established in late 1965 from those meetings and tasked with coming up with recommendations, among other things, for continuing and strengthening the East Africa Cooperation in order to address the problem of disintegration. The Committee, consisting of three ministers from each state and chaired by a former Danish finance minister, Professor Kjeld Philip, began work early in 1966 and presented its report in May 1966. The Philip's Commission was also the basis for negotiations with the East African Community. This is because the three heads of state directed the Commission to write a treaty based on the Philip Report (Green, 1967).

The outcomes of those negotiations were the draft Treaty for East African Cooperation, which was submitted to the East African government in May 1966 (Hazlewood, 1979). After further negotiations, the Treaty of East African Cooperation was signed in June 1967 by the three heads of state and came into effect on December 1st, 1967, with an agreement of cooperation on a wide range of economic and social issues (EAC 1967). Consequently, these agreements were replaced by the 1967 Treaty for East African Cooperation (Green, 1967; Hazlewood, 1979; Bar, 2018). According to Mangachi (2011), the conclusion of the treaty demonstrated the willingness of the three states to work together and their fear of the consequences of splitting apart. It was a typical example of a sub-regional organisation whose members were connected through the history of British colonialism and experienced integration solutions in colonial times.

The Treaty specified the main areas of cooperation in which the three partner states agreed to cooperate and establish an East African Community and, as an integral part of such Community, an East African Common Market of the three partner states: Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda (Mangachi, 2011). In addition, the establishment of a common market, uniform customs duties, and a comparable range of public services were among the community's top priorities, all of which were intended to support balanced economic growth across the region. The organisation had already achieved currency parity-the recognition of the Tanzanian, Kenyan, and Ugandan shillings as having equal value-and had operated as a monetary union with a currency board. An all-East African railway, harbour and airways system, postal service, telegraph, and East African Development Bank were to be established by a merger of public businesses. One of the first attempts at regionalism in history, the treaty was dubbed the world's most advanced regional trade treaty. It was established to foster political, socioeconomic, and cultural cooperation among the peoples of East Africa and to acquire a common voice in international affairs.

Nevertheless, the 1967 project of the EAC was dissolved in 1977 for a number of reasons including ideological differences between capitalist Kenya and socialist-communist Tanzania; political divisions between Uganda and other EAC Partner States; and foreign interests aimed at disintegrating East Africa to avoid a strong federation emerging at the apex of the Nile Valley in the middle of Africa; and lack of steering functions, unequal distribution of benefits; and irreconcilable differences of opinion between key players, particularly between the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin and the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere; the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits from the Community among the Partner States due to their disparate levels of development; and lack of appropriate policies to address this situation.

However, in the years that followed the collapse of the first EAC, the three former member states attempted to regulate economic affairs by means of individual multilateral agreements. At the same time, the desire and interest in reviving the EAC remained, as future events showed. Therefore, ad hoc trilateral meetings were held to deal with the pragmatic issues of dissolving the EAC (Mangachi, 2011; Schimmelfennig et al., 2020). From the early 1990s on, the region witnessed a number of negotiation meetings between Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda on possible exploration of areas for future cooperation as well as the revival of the Community. Results from those meetings between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were signed as the East African Mediation Agreement (1984) for the division of assets and liabilities on May 14, 1984, in Arusha, Tanzania (EAC, 2000).

One of the provisions of the Mediation Agreement provided that the three Member States agreed to explore areas for future cooperation and to make highly concrete arrangements for such cooperation (EAC 2000, EAC 2016; Schimmelfennig et al., 2021). For example, they began with the agreement of joint operation of a limited number of regional institutions, such as the East African Inter-University Committee, the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), the EAC Library Services, and the East African Development Bank (EADB). Subsequent meetings of the three heads of state led to signing of the Agreement for the Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation, which was set up on November 30th 1993 (Schimmelfennig et al., *ibid.*), a coordinating institution that in 1998 produced a draft treaty for the later EAC.

In line with the above spirit, cooperation on security matters was also initiated during this period (Reith and Boltz, 2011). Therefore, on January 22nd 1999, the EAC Partner States signed a MoU on Foreign Policy and Security Coordination. In light of the need to consolidate regional cooperation, the Treaty for Establishment of the EAC was finally signed on November 30, 1999, at the 4th summit of the Authority in Arusha, and entered into force on 7 July, 2000 following its ratification by the original three Partners-Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Reactivating the EAC with membership comparable to that of the years 1967 to 1977. The process of establishing the new EAC included the creation of a common foreign policy. The EAC Partner States had already completed a MoU on Foreign Policy Coordination in January 1999, even before the EAC Treaty was signed on November 30th, 1999. This suggests that coordinating foreign policy is one of the top objectives of the EAC (EAC-EALA, 2022).

According to the treaty, the community's participating states must establish and carry out shared foreign and security policies. These policies aim to foster cooperation, including a dedication to discourse in international forums, and to establish the EAC as a unified entity in its interactions with the world community. In the framework of the Community, partner states are dedicated to working together on projects involving information sharing, multilateral diplomacy, economic and social activities, consular services, and liaison. The policy's Article 6 (2(a)) requires the partner states to coordinate their positions at the regional and global levels on a number of issues, including the Regional Economic Communities of the African Union and other bodies established by the Abuja Treaty for the creation of the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the AU (EAC, 2010).

A Sectoral Council on Foreign Policy Coordination was established in March 2008. Similar to Article 123 of the Treaty, partner states are required to put in place a common foreign security policy with the objectives of promoting cooperation at international forums as well as strengthening international security among the partner states and within the regional bloc (EAC, 1999). Similarly, in line with the oversight role of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), Article 59(3c) of the EAC Treaty, *inter alia*, provides that "the Assembly shall hold an annual debate on the report to be submitted to it by the Council on the progress made by the Community in the development of its common foreign and security policies" (EAC, 2002: pg.44).

On December 3, 2010, an agreement was reached to upgrade the MoU on Foreign Policy Coordination between the Partner States to an EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination. Articles 5, 6, 7, 123, and 125 of the EAC Treaty reinforce the Protocol, which requires partner nations to work together and coordinate on foreign policy issues and to seek shared international goals that will increase integration gains (EAC, 2010). However, the policy was still pending Tanzania's ratification by the time this article was written. This is not a good indicator of progress made by the EAC in ratifying this protocol due to the fact that it has been more than 12 years since negotiations for the foreign policy coordination protocol were concluded. This protocol hasn't been fully ratified yet, though. The EAC bloc's efforts to coordinate its foreign policy may face obstacles due to the actions of certain member states.

5. Identifying the Limiting Factors

Channels and structures for developing EAC foreign policy coordination have evolved since the ratification of the current EAC in early 2000, and the process is still underway. However, EAC foreign policy coordination in a broad sense remains divided into two components: the EAC foreign policy (including member states' individual foreign policies) and the external action led by the foreign actors as well as NGOs. The EAC Member States are less willing to engage in collective foreign policy making at the EAC level, prioritising other multilateral frameworks or unilateral national actions.

Moreover, the EAC Treaty mandates that a common foreign policy be adopted (see EAC 2000.Art 123(1)). Nevertheless, in defiance of the treaty's requirements, the partner states have decided to coordinate rather than integrate their foreign policies (EAC, 2010). This confirms rational choice theory which contends that individual states can use self-interest to make choices that will provide them with the greatest benefit. The completely ratified policy was delayed, and there were no updates regarding the status of the policy's implementation, which demonstrated the actual situation. The fact that certain EAC members, particularly Tanzania, have not yet ratified the Protocol is one of the reasons for this uneven implementation of the policy among members. The EAC's current lack of coherence among its partner states and institutions is impeding its ability to act, particularly in terms of coordinating foreign policy. Member nations frequently view policy issues differently from one another. This situation creates several identifiable limiting factors.

First, the EAC bloc's partner states faced significant challenges to their political and economic integration because of a deficiency of political will to act decisively as a regional bloc in the implementation of protocols and agreements in foreign policy coordination in a timely manner.³ For instance, the delay of some member states to ratify the policy protocol and other members who have ratified but still choose to coordinate their foreign policies and not integrate as provided by the EAC Treaty is a sign of a lack of political will.

Second, state self-interest is another major reason for the delay. The EAC member states first of all act according to national interests, and EAC's interests come second. Therefore, this situation of competing state self-interest is among the major factors hindering smooth implementation of the foreign policy of the regional bloc. This conforms with the rational choice theory which contends that people weigh their options and make the choice they think will serve them best. This situation frequently affects the EAC Secretariat's ability to arrive at united positions in the implementation of the coordination of foreign policies. Besides that, as the EAC member states number is increasing, the task of materialising EAC common foreign policy has proved to be quite complicated. The EAC, especially the new member states (Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, South Sudan, and Somalia), have very different historical backgrounds, and consequently, their understanding of foreign policy coordination in the bloc varies widely. Geographical location is undoubtedly a key factor in defining the interests and agenda of

³ Political will in the context of this paper would therefore refer to a strong desire or determination on the part of the EAC member states to advance political and economic integration by taking action that actually advances integration.

each country, as there are cultural and linguistic divergencies. Some EAC states focus on regional and continental integration, while others are highly interested in handling their internal conflict and border problems (for instance, the case of South Sudan, the DRC, and Rwanda). Getting so many different voices to sing the same tune is a task that requires a great deal of finesse as well as a strong commitment from each member.

Overprotection under the umbrella of national interest would therefore never lead to hopes of larger integration and collaboration in foreign policy. The breakdown of the previous (first) EAC and the reasons for the delay in ratifying the EAC foreign policy were both made evident in the preceding section of this article. Important strategic choices should be made on the fly to advance group goals rather than the national agenda in order to reduce this kind of behaviour. Achieving foreign policy goals that align with national strategic interests requires pursuing policy interaction that is inclusive of political and economic regional institutions and shared interests. In other words, a regional organisation will more likely expand and develop if the interests of individual members (states) or their constituents are in line with its overall goals.

Third, delaying the ratification of protocols and conventions adopted by the community is another cause for the delay in the implementation the EAC foreign policy. Protocols and accords are often signed by the EAC; however, they are rarely ratified on time or put into effect. The 2010 Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination is a prime example, as this article pointed out. This demonstrates unequivocally that the only way to guarantee successful implementation is for member states to commit to implementing the policy.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The article identifies and discusses challenges in implementing the EAC Protocol on foreign policy coordination. Since the policy was signed more than a decade ago, the implementation is still going on, but too slowly. Some progress is being made, but at a slow pace. Its performance produces mixed results and is sometimes disappointing due to frequent disagreements and competition among partner states in areas such as security and trade. Lack of capacity by the EAC to implement the policy also contributes to the current dilemma of a lack of expectations for the implementation of the protocol. The EAC's role as an international actor in the foreign policy and security field is not yet strengthened, and mistrust between member states demonstrates that decisive moves towards full implementation of the policy towards the establishment of common foreign policies by member states as provided by the EAC Treaty have not been achieved by the EAC or member states. The core argument of this article is that the implementation of the present foreign policy protocol is important but remains deficient because of the unwillingness of the member states to implement the policy, the delay of some of the member states to ratify the policy protocol, and some of the member states choosing the coordination path of the policy instead of integrating their national policies, as an example.

The article contends that for smooth implementation of the policy, member states shall put aside their own interests in order to reach consensus on many problems linked to the aforesaid policy. Otherwise, the long-awaited EAC regional foreign policy adapted to each different scenario will remain unresolved. This is due to the fact that the member nations' support and commitments are crucial to the EAC's success in its foreign policy

ambitions. The EAC institutions often work in an uncoordinated manner, and there is insufficient coherence between action on the EAC and the member-state level. In order to become a credible global actor, the EAC needs to overcome this fragmentation and bring its various foreign policy instruments together in a coherent fashion in a regional, continental, and globalised world through updated methodology and a highly joined-up approach. To confront challenges including security in the region, migration flows, and state failure.

A connection is observable between the current state of affairs and Article 123(4) of the EAC Treaty, which stipulates that the formulation of a common foreign policy ought to be methodical and carried out gradually, contingent upon the degree of community collaboration. Consequently, the operationalization of security and shared foreign policy is process-oriented, requiring a high level of consensus at various application stages. At times, opinions on how quickly to harmonise the policies do not seem to agree. Therefore, for the EAC regional integration to have a good effect, member states must speed up the process of coordinating and harmonising the various foreign policy components while also monitoring the pace at which it is happening.

This article argues that the long-aspired EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination tailored to each different scenario will remain an unsolved puzzle unless member states leave and set aside their individual particular interests. This will contribute to the realisation of full ratification and implementation of a common regional foreign policy. The objective of the discourse is to determine the challenges of instituting and implementing the already agreed common foreign policy through the EAC Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination. The study assumes that uncommitted leadership and dysfunctional institutional arrangements, together with the tendency of member states' prioritisation of their national foreign aspirations, have all impeded and continue to be hurdles against this dream.

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Journal Policy and Author Guidelines

1. About IDRJ

The International Diplomatic Review Journal (IDRJ) is a peer reviewed journal managed by the Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations. It serves local and international institutions, researchers, graduate students, policy makers and other stakeholders working towards solving social, political and economic problems plus other related issues in Tanzania, Africa and the wider global community.

2. Scope

The IDRJ publishes research articles, review articles, book reviews, ambassadorial notes and policy briefs about theory, practice, processes and outcomes of diplomacy and related fields of International relations, Peace, Conflicts, Economic diplomacy, Language in diplomacy, International security, Diaspora and immigration, Civil-military relations, Organised crime, Regional cooperation, International development, Negotiations, Refugees, Diplomatic communication, International trade, Global governance, and Strategic partnership

3. Publication Frequency

Regular issues are published twice a year, June and December. Supplement issues may be published occasionally at any other time of the year.

4. Privacy Statement

The names and email addresses entered in this journal will be used exclusively for the stated purposes of this journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.

5. Submission of Articles

Manuscripts must be original and should neither be simultaneously submitted to nor previously published in any other journal. Manuscript submission implies that consents of author(s) and the permission of the concerned institutes have been obtained. IDRJ accepts manuscript with similarity check up to thirty percentage (30%). Submissions of articles can be made via diplomatic.journal@cfr.ac.tz

6. The Review Process

IDRJ uses double blind peer review system, that manuscript author(s) do not know the reviewer and the reviewers do not know the names of author(s). A manuscript should not contain any information concerning author's name(s), institutional affiliation, etc. Information concerning author's name(s), addresses, institution, title, abstract and key words should be included in the title page and sent separately.

The review process undergoes the following stages:

- 6.1 Receipt of articles from author(s);
- 6.2 Initial check by the chief editor and feedback to author(s) (within two weeks from submission deadline);
- 6.3 Articles are sent to the editorial board for vetting before sending to peer reviewers;
- 6.4 Articles are sent to peer reviewers who are experts in respective fields of the articles;
- 6.5 Reviewed feedback is sent to the authors for appropriate corrections (within eight weeks from submission deadline);
- 6.6 Receipt of author(s) corrections matrix (two weeks after receiving review feedbacks).
- 6.7 Articles are vetted and compiled by the editorial board.

7. Author(s) Guidelines

In preparing manuscript for submission to IDRJ, author(s) should observe the following:

- 7.1 The manuscript falls within the IDRJ scope.
- 7.2 The entire manuscript is in Times New Roman font, size 12, double spaced, justified and paginated.
- 7.3 The submitted manuscript is in original editable files (MS Word).
- 7.4 All figures, images, tables, charts are embedded into the original file within their respective locations.
- 7.5 The manuscript is in gender free United Kingdom English.
- 7.6 The length of the submitted manuscript for original research and review articles is between 5,000 - 8,000 words, ambassadorial note, book review and policy brief is between 800-1500 words.
- 7.7 The title of the manuscript is capitalized, in Times New Roman font and size 14. The length of the title is a maximum of 20 words.
- 7.8 The headings and sub headings are numbered with each word capitalized and formatted as follows:
 - i) Heading level one: bold (**1. Introduction**)
 - ii) Heading level two: bold italics (***1.1 International Order***)
 - iii) If a third level is necessary: lower case roman (i. New World Order)

7.9 Referencing Style

The referencing follows the sixth version of the American Psychological Association (APA) style. At least 50% of all references used are less than five years from the date of publication.

Some examples of APA referencing style:

i. In-text citations

APA uses the 'author-date' style of referencing. That is, in-text references (generally) appear in the following format when referencing at the end of a sentence (Author's Last Name, Year of Publication).

Example... toward class and other students (Weinstein, 2007).

When referencing at the beginning of a sentence: *Author as part of the text, (the year of publication in parenthesis).*

Example...Malisa (2004) further stressed that it is evident...

The following are examples of citing from two authors: When referencing at the beginning of a sentence, *cite both names each time the reference appears in the text. Do not use et al.*

Example: Emmanuel and Rose (2008) further stressed that it is evident...

When referencing at the end of a sentence: *Authors and year in parenthesis, use the symbol 'and' to separate the authors, followed by comma to separate the year.*

Example: livestock keepers and crop farmers (Ismaeel & Ahmed, 2009).

The following are examples of citing from three and more authors:

Cite all the names of the authors the first time you cite.

Example: Kimaro, Joseph and Moureen (2006) pointed out that...

Cite the same three and more authors within the same paragraph. In this situation, cite the first author followed by et al. and exclude the year.

Example: Kimaro, Joseph, and Moureen (2006) pointed out ... Kimaro et al. also...

Cite the same three and more authors in subsequent paragraphs. In this case, cite the first author, et al., and include the year of publication.

Example: Kimaro et al. (2006) discovered...

Quotations

If using a direct quotation or statistical material you must also put the relevant page numbers, example (Smith, 2006, p.121).

Quotations of less than 40 words are enclosed within double quotation marks (“ ”).

Quotations of more than 40 words should be sent out in a block, commencing on a new line and indented 3 spaces from the left-hand margin. Quotation marks are not used for the block.

When directly quoting from a source, the quote is enclosed in double quotation marks with author name, year of publication and page number(s) in brackets.

Example: “A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction” (Woolf, 1929, p. 6).

Note: For multiple pages, use the abbreviation ‘pp.’ and include the full-page range. Example: Woolf (1929, pp. 64-67) observes that...

TEMCO (2011, p.62) reports that:

Donor funding was significant in the 1995 and 2000 elections, which gave donors some say in the manner in which the polls were managed. In the 1995 elections, for example, donors pressurized the NEC to allow the counting of votes at polling stations. This was adopted and since then, it has reduced tensions surrounding the transfer of ballot boxes. A commission report indicated that a senior government official from the Prime Minister’s office tried to attend a NEC meeting where that decision was made; the NEC prevented him from doing so.

When directly quoting from an interviewee, the quote is italicised and enclosed in single quotation marks

Example... For instance, during the campaign rally at Chankele village, a citizen by the name Msafiri Mrisho Mpambije asked:

‘You have said that you have worked for 30 years without any reprimand from your employer, who was the government. It seems to me that you are obedient to the government. Don’t you see that if elected, you will continue to obey the government and thus fear to represent our concerns?’

ii. Bibliography

At the end of the manuscript, there should be a complete bibliography, this should be in alphabetical order, formatted as follows;

Journal Article:

Online journal article with digital object identifier (DOI)

Kshetri, Nir (2019). Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in Africa. *Journal of Global Information Technology Management*, 22(2), 77-81. Available at: DOI: 10.1080/1097198X.2019.1603527 (Accessed April 20021).

Book:

Maundeni, Z. (2005). *40 Years of Democracy in Botswana:1965-2005*. Gaborone: Mmegi Publishing House.

Chapter in Book:

Guion, R.M. (1991). Personnel assessment, selection, and replacement. In M. D. Dunnet & L.M. Hough (Eds.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 327 - 397). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Dissertation or Thesis:

Mauer, K. F. (1976). *The Assessment of Human Resources Utilization*. (Unpublished D Com Thesis). Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.

From the Internet:

United Nations. (2002). *New marketing strategies* [online]. Available at: <http://www.admar.com/marketing2001/> (Accessed 10 December 2002).

If undated:

United Nations. (n.d.). *New marketing strategies* [online]. Retrieved from: <http://www.admar.com/marketing2001/> (10 December 2002).

8.The abstract length is of 150 to 200 words indicating what the article is all about, methods, key argument/assumption, conclusions drawn and recommendations (if any), accompanied by five to eight keywords.

9. Structure of the article

The article is expected to contain the following key sections: introduction, main body, conclusions, recommendations, and bibliography.

10. Copyrights and License

When the manuscript is accepted for publication, the authors agreed to automatic transfer of copyrights to the publisher. By submitting a manuscript to the IDRJ, author(s) are deemed to have granted permission to publish the manuscript. IDRJ is licensed under Creative Commons Index CC BY-NC 4.0.

11.Article types**11.1 Original Research Article**

Original *Research Articles* present theory-based, empirical studies that employ rigorous methodology. The research must be theory-driven or result in the development of a new theory or the refinement of an existing theory. Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods are acceptable.

11.2 Review Articles

Review Articles are aimed at giving an overview of a particular subject within the IDRJ scope for a wider audience that includes recent advances in an area in which an author has been actively engaged. Review articles will be considered from prominent thinkers and authorities on invitation by the Editorial Board.

11.3 Ambassadorial note

This is a non-academic short advisory communication written by an ambassador. It covers subject of interest related to experiences in the practice of international relations and diplomacy.

11.4 Policy Brief

A policy brief provides evidence-based policy advice to help makers of foreign policy to make informed decisions on a single subject. It presents research findings and recommendations that draw clear links to policy initiatives.

11.5 Book Review

The reviewed book shall not be more than six months (for an online published) and one year (for a normal book) since the date of publication. Relevant books are scholarly monographs and collections that fit within the scope of the journal. Please note that, IDRJ does not, except in very rare cases review autobiographies, memoirs and fictions. A book review should evaluate the arguments of a book rather than repeat information readily available online. In other words, it should not be a chapter-by-chapter summary of a text, but rather a critical discussion of its themes, structure, and style that places the text within the context of scholarly literature.